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THE ENDURING LEGACIES OF THE HAITIAN REFUGEE LITIGATION
 Why still talk about the “Haitian Refugee Litigation,”1 Haitian Centers Council, 
Inc. v. Sale, twenty-five years later? After all, fine books have been written about the 
litigation: Brandt Goldstein’s gripping nonfiction novel, Storming the Court,2 and the 
accompanying Civil Procedure teaching materials expertly assembled by Brandt 
Goldstein, Rodger Citron, and Molly Beutz Land.3 The episode has been used as a 
case study for Procedure classes at Yale, Columbia, Touro Law School, University of 
Connecticut, and New York Law School, just to name a few. The episode has spawned 
many articles.4 And symposia held over the last few years have commemorated the 
litigation as a paradigm for human rights advocacy, not just here at New York Law 
School,5 but also at Yale,6 Columbia,7 and Howard University Law Schools.8
1. I use the term Haitian refugee litigation to describe the complex set of cases known as Sale v. Haitian 
Centers Council, Inc., 509 U.S. 155 (1993) (direct return case); Haitian Centers Council, Inc. v. Sale, 823 
F. Supp. 1028 (E.D.N.Y. 1993) (Guantánamo detention case) (permanent injunction), vacated by 
settlement; and Haitian Centers Council, Inc. v. McNary, No. 92 CV 1258, 1992 WL 155853, at *1 
(E.D.N.Y. Apr. 6) (Guantánamo detention case) (preliminary injunction), aff ’d in part, vacated in part, 
969 F.2d 1326 (2d Cir. 1992), vacated as moot sub nom. Sale, 509 U.S. 155. For a summary of how the 
various pieces of the litigation unfolded, see generally Harold Hongju Koh & Michael J. Wishnie, The 
Story of Sale v. Haitian Centers Council: Guantánamo and Refoulement, in Human Rights Advocacy 
Stories 385 (Deena R. Hurwitz et al. eds., 2009).
2. Brandt Goldstein, Storming the Court: How a Band of Law Students Fought the 
President—and Won (First Scribner trade paperback ed. 2006).
3. Brandt Goldstein et al., A Documentary Companion to Storming the Court (2009).
4. See, e.g., Raymond H. Brescia, Through a Glass, Clearly; Reflections on Team Lawyering, Clinically Taught, 
61 N.Y.L. Sch. L. Rev. 87 (2016); Harold Hongju Koh, America’s Offshore Refugee Camps, 29 U. Rich. L. 
Rev. 139 (1995) [hereinafter Koh, Refugee Camps]; Harold Hongju Koh, Reflections on Refoulement and 
Haitian Centers Council, 35 Harv. Int’l L.J. 1 (1994); Harold Hongju Koh, The “Haiti Paradigm” in 
United States Human Rights Policy, 103 Yale L.J. 2391 (1994) [hereinafter Koh, The “Haiti Paradigm”]; 
Harold Hongju Koh, The Human Face of the Haitian Interdiction Program, 33 Va. J. Int’l L. 483 (1993); 
Koh & Wishnie, supra note 1; Michael Ratner, How We Closed the Guantánamo HIV Camp: The Intersection 
of Politics and Litigation, 11 Harv. Hum. Rts. J. 187 (1998); The Lowenstein Int’l Human Rights Clinic, 
Aliens and the Duty of Nonrefoulement: Haitian Centers Council v. McNary, 6 Harv. Hum. Rts. J. 1 
(1993); Victoria Clawson et al., Essay, Litigating as Law Students: An Inside Look at Haitian Centers 
Council, 103 Yale L.J. 2337 (1994); Andrew G. Pizor, Comment, Sale v. Haitian Centers Council: The 
Return of Haitian Refugees, 17 Fordham Int’l L.J. 1062 (1994).
5. For a collection of the speeches delivered at the New York Law School symposium, see Storming the 
Court: 25 Years After H.C.C. v. Sale: Program, N.Y.L. Sch. L. Rev., http://www.nylslawreview.com/
storming-the-court-program/ (last visited Nov. 7, 2016).
6. For a collection of the papers presented at the Yale symposium, see Harold Hongju Koh, YLS Sale 
Symposium: Sale’s Legacies, Opinio Juris (Mar. 17, 2014, 11:54 AM), http://opiniojuris.org/2014/03/17/
yls-sale-symposium-sales-legacies/.
7. In 2013, Columbia Law School’s Human Rights Institute hosted a series of symposia discussing the 
Haitian refugee litigation. See The Legal Legacy of Sale v. Haitian Centers Council, Hum. Rts. Inst., 
https://web.law.columbia.edu/sites/default/files/microsites/human-rights-institute/sale_series.pdf (last 
visited Nov. 7, 2016).
8. On January 23, 2014, Howard University School of Law hosted a symposium regarding the Haitian 
refugee litigation. See 20 Years After “Storming the Court”: A Living Room Discussion, How. U. Sch. L., 
http://www.law.howard.edu/1756 (last updated Jan. 15, 2014).
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 Perhaps the case still resonates because of the extraordinary public interest 
engagement by the litigation’s graduates, who formed the group we called “Team 
Haiti.”9 Maybe the story inspires today’s law students because of the astonishing 
9. Looking only at the “alumni” of the case who attended the New York Law School symposium, Michelle 
Anderson became Dean of City University of New York School of Law, and is now President of 
Brooklyn College. See Storming the Court: 25 Years After H.C.C. v. Sale: Speakers, N.Y.L. Sch. L. Rev., 
http://www.nylslawreview.com/storming-the-court-speakers/ (last visited Nov. 7, 2016). Michael Barr, 
a professor at the University of Michigan Law School, served as Assistant Secretary of the Treasury for 
Financial Institutions. Id. Graham Boyd was founding director of the American Civil Liberties Union’s 
(ACLU) Drug Law Reform Project, an area in which he continues to work. Id. Ray Brescia is a professor 
and Director of the Government Law Center at Albany Law School. Id. Tory Clawson is Associate Vice 
President for Strategic Operations at Save the Children. Id. Chris Coons is a U.S. Senator from 
Delaware. Id. Lisa Daugaard is Policy Director of the Public Defender Association of Seattle. Id. 
Catherine Powell is a professor at Fordham Law School and former staff member of the Obama 
National Security Council and the State Department’s Office of Policy Planning. Id. Paul Sonn is 
General Counsel at the National Employment Law Project. Id. Joe Tringali, Of Counsel at Simpson 
Thacher & Bartlett LLP, has litigated and won numerous significant pro bono cases, including the trial 
of the Haitian refugee case. Id. Mike Wishnie is William O. Douglas Professor of Clinical Law, Deputy 
Dean for Experiential Education, and Director of the Jerome N. Frank Legal Services Organization at 
Yale Law School. Id.
Those who could not attend the New York Law School forum have made comparably extraordinary 
accomplishments. To name just a few, Anupam Chander is a professor at the University of California 
Davis School of Law. Anupam Chander Biography, UCDavis Sch. L., https://law.ucdavis.edu/faculty/
chander/ (last visited Nov. 7, 2016). Rodger Citron is an Associate Dean for Academic Affairs and a 
professor at Touro Law School. Rodger Citron Biography, Touro L., http://www.tourolaw.edu/
AboutTouroLaw/bio.aspx?id=7 (last visited Nov. 7, 2016). Sarah Cleveland is Louis Henkin Professor of 
Human and Constitutional Rights and Co-Director of the Human Rights Institute at Columbia Law 
School, former Counselor of International Law at the State Department, and U.N.-elected U.S. member 
of the Human Rights Committee. Sarah H. Cleveland Biography, Colum. L. Sch., http://www.law.
columbia.edu/fac/Sarah_Cleveland (last visited Nov. 7, 2016). Elizabeth Detweiler is a law clerk to a 
leading federal judge in Houston, Texas. Margareth Etienne is a professor at the University of Illinois 
School of Law. Margareth Etienne Biography, Ill. L., https://www.law.illinois.edu/faculty/profile/
margarethetienne (last visited Nov. 7, 2016). Eric Falkenstein is a leading Broadway producer. Some of 
his great plays include The Color Purple, Clybourne Park, The Norman Conquests, and The History Boys. 
See Erik Falkenstein Biography, IBDB, https://www.ibdb.com/broadway-cast-staff/eric-falkenstein-
92601/#broadway (last visited Nov. 7, 2016). Henry Fernandez is the founding Executive Director of 
LEAP and a former Deputy Mayor of New Haven, Connecticut. Henry Fernandez Biography, 
Fernandez Advisors, http://www.fernandezadvisors.net/henry-fernandez.html (last visited Nov. 7, 
2016). Lucas Guttentag is Senior Counselor to the Secretary of Homeland Security. Lucas Guttentag 
Biography, SLS, https://law.stanford.edu/directory/lucas-guttentag/ (last visited Nov. 7, 2016). Anthony 
K. (Van) Jones is a well-known commentator on CNN. Van Jones Biography, CNN, http://www.cnn.
com/profiles/van-jones-profile#about (last visited Nov. 7, 2016). Christy Lopez is Deputy Chief in the 
Special Litigation Section of the Civil Rights Division at the U.S. Department of Justice. Christy E. 
Lopez Biography, Geo. L., http://www.law.georgetown.edu/faculty/lopez-christy-e.cfm# (last visited 
Nov. 7, 2016). L. Song Richardson is a professor at the University of California Irvine School of Law. L. 
Song Richardson Biography, U. Cal. Irvine Sch. L., http://www.law.uci.edu/faculty/full-time/
richardson/ (last visited Nov. 7, 2016). Margo Schlanger is a professor and former official of the 
Department of Homeland Security who directs the Civil Rights Litigation Clearinghouse at the 
University of Michigan Law School. Margo Schlanger Biography, Mich. L., http://www.law.umich.edu/
FacultyBio/Pages/FacultyBio.aspx?FacID=mschlan (last visited Nov. 7, 2016). Cecillia Wang is the 
Director of the ACLU Immigrants’ Rights Project and incoming Deputy Legal Director of the ACLU. 
Biography of Cecillia Wang, ACLU, https://www.aclu.org/biography-cecillia-wang (last visited Nov. 7, 
2016). And these are only some of the many who helped. Let me take this moment to thank all of them, 
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idealism and dedication of the Yale students.10 By today’s standards, it seems almost 
impossible to imagine young law students litigating a case that went to the Second 
Circuit five times and the Supreme Court eight times in fifteen months, in an era 
without laptops, Internet, iPads, or cellphones.11 Maybe it is because of the attention 
the lawsuit attracted from such famous public figures as Jonathan Demme, Reverend 
Jesse Jackson, Tim Robbins, and Susan Sarandon.12 Or maybe it’s just because it was 
as well as Ethan Balogh, Wade Chow, Anthony Cichello, Mercer Givhan, Carl Goldfarb, Adam 
Gutride, Thomas Hammack, Laura Ho, Laurie Hoefer, Serge Learsy, Christine Martin-Nicholson, 
Feisal Naqvi, Stephen Roos, Jonathan Ross, Veronique Sanchez-Scalzo, Jeannie Su, Jessica Weisel, 
Jonathan Weissglass, and so many other deeply committed members of “Team Haiti” for their incredible 
contributions to the Haitian refugee litigation. See David Cole, Michael Ratner’s Army, N.Y. Rev. Books 
(May 15, 2016, 1:45 PM), http://www.nybooks.com/daily/2016/05/15/michael-ratner-army-fight-
against-guantanamo/ (providing information about Team Haiti and the significance of the Haitian 
refugee litigation as a human rights achievement).
Even our opposing counsel, who were deeply affected by their role in the litigation, deserve sincere 
thanks: Bob Begleiter and Scott Dunn attended the Storming the Court symposium and Paul Cappuccio 
sent money and worked behind the scenes to support individual Haitian immigrants. When I was being 
blocked for Senate confirmation as State Department Legal Adviser, former Solicitor General Ken 
Starr, then President of Baylor University, sent an unsolicited letter to the Senate Foreign Relations 
Committee backing my candidacy. I remain touched by each and every one of these acts of kindness. 
10. I remember, for example, working in my office at three o’clock in the morning on the day that our first 
Second Circuit brief was due at noon. Our litigation manager, Ray Brescia, then a third-year law student, 
stuck his head in and asked urgently whether I was planning to have the brief cite checked before it was 
filed. Exhausted, I grunted that we could not do so without at least ten cite checkers. An hour later, I 
heard noises in the hallway and emerged to find ten sleepy students—wearing glasses, pajamas, and 
sweatpants—waiting outside my office. Ray had gone down the dormitory hallway, banging on the doors 
of sleeping students who had little or nothing to do with the case, demanding that they “save the Haitians 
by getting up to cite check part of this brief.” As I watched the students disappear down the hall heading 
to the all-night library, I began to think that maybe we might have a chance after all.
11. See generally Clawson et al., supra note 4 (discussing the Haitian refugee litigation). Back in those days, 
our highest level of technology was the fax machine, which was relatively new at the time. Students 
compiled their research and drafts on three-and-a-half-inch diskettes, which we merged together to 
create long, ungainly documents. Our computers had green screens and took minutes to boot up. In a 
world without cellphones, every time I went somewhere, I had to call back to our makeshift office to 
make sure that something disastrous hadn’t happened. On one occasion, I got off a train at Grand 
Central Station and called our office only to be told that Judge Johnson had just summoned us for a 
telephone hearing on an emergency motion. I ran to the Grand Hyatt Hotel next to Grand Central and 
talked my way into a maître d’s station at a nearby restaurant to gain access to a speakerphone. When 
Michael Ratner came on, I could hear cheering in the background. When I asked him where on earth 
he was, he said, “I’m under the bleachers at a Mets game, speaking to you on something called a ‘mobile 
phone.’” This was the first time I was ever on a cellphone call. And even as the conference call with the 
judge proceeded and I was making my oral argument, customers kept coming up and asking, “Table for 
four?,” as I tried to wave them away.
12. See Ratner, supra note 4, at 216–17 (describing civil disobedience by Jackson, Demme, and Sarandon on 
the first day of trial, and statements by Sarandon and Robbins made as presenters at the Academy Awards).
I will never forget traveling to Guantánamo with Jesse Jackson and Michael Ratner on Valentine’s 
Day, 1993. We learned that for one day, we could rent a propeller plane for $7,500, a charge I put on my 
overextended credit card. The administrative head of Reverend Jackson’s group, the Rainbow PUSH 
Coalition, called and asked, “Professor, are you going to Guantánamo on a jet?” I said, “No, a jet costs 
$20,000 for a day, which we can’t afford.” In pitying tones, she replied, “Oh, Professor, don’t you know? 
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the first time most of us ever heard of Guantánamo.13
 Whatever the reason, even a quarter of a century later, people love to talk about 
the Haitian refugee litigation. But what are the litigation’s enduring legacies? Let me 
mention just four.
 First, looking back, the Haitian refugee litigation was the first time most of us 
ever heard arguments urging the recognition of “legal black holes”—geographic 
zones or issue areas to which the law supposedly does not apply14—with respect to 
mass migrations, high seas interdictions, armed conflict zones, the extraterritoriality 
of human rights treaties, and Guantánamo. Second, the Haitian case revealed the 
rise of transnationalism and “transnational legal process”15: the complex process by 
You get two jets: one for Reverend and the other for the press. I’ll fax you a list of journalists who 
normally travel with Reverend. You call them up and tell them the price is $5,000 per seat and you will 
pay for both jets.” And that, my friends, was how we got to Guantánamo. 
At one point, during our plane ride down, someone asked Reverend Jackson, “What would you 
like to say about race in America?” He looked at me and a light went on. He asked, “Does anybody 
know that Harold Koh, the man representing the black Haitians, is a Korean man?” Then his voice rose, 
and he was off on a huge rhyming speech, which he repeated many times as he crisscrossed America 
over the next few months. Every day for weeks afterward, I would get voicemails from friends saying, 
“Jesse Jackson was just here,” or “ just spoke at our graduation,” or “was on The Arsenio Hall Show,” each 
time asking rhetorically, “If you want to know the real story of race in America, does anybody know that 
the lawyer representing the black Haitians is a Korean man, Harold Koh?” 
When we landed in Guantánamo on Valentine’s Day, 1993, the U.S. military commandant 
initially would not let us enter the base. I was arguing with the commandant, when Reverend Jesse 
Jackson called me over. He said, “Harold, let’s not argue with the mailman” (a phrase that later became 
a trope in my household). Grabbing his cellphone, Jesse said, “I’m going to call Sandy Berger” who was 
Deputy National Security Advisor at the time. A few moments later, the commandant waved us into the 
base. The lesson I took away: “Let’s not argue with the mailman.” Always call the actual decisionmaker.
13. I first heard of Guantánamo in the song “Guantanamera,” a story of a girl from Guantánamo, dating 
back to the 1920s, with lyrics attributed to José Martí, music by Joseíto Fernández, and popularized by 
American singer, Pete Seeger. See David Cheal, The Life of a Song: ‘Guantanamera,’ Fin. Times (Mar. 13, 
2015), https://www.ft.com/content/2a530e04-c407-11e4-a02e-00144feab7de. Since then, Guantánamo 
has become part of our popular culture, most famously in the 1992 Academy Award-nominated Rob 
Reiner film, A Few Good Men, written by Aaron Sorkin, which featured Jack Nicholson telling Tom 
Cruise, a JAG officer defending a Guantánamo court-martial, “You can’t handle the truth!” A Few Good 
Men, IMDb, http://www.imdb.com/title/tt0104257/ (last visited Nov. 7, 2016). For other examples of 
Guantánamo in popular culture, see Harold & Kumar Escape from Guantánamo Bay, IMDb, http://www.
imdb.com/title/tt0481536/ (last visited Nov. 7, 2016), and Camp X-Ray, IMDb, http://www.imdb.com/
title/tt2994190/ (last visited Nov. 7, 2016).
14. See Andrew Kent, Disappearing Legal Black Holes and Converging Domains: Changing Individual Rights 
Protection in National Security and Foreign Affairs, 115 Colum. L. Rev. 1029, 1029 (2015) (defining 
“legal black holes” as “domains where legal protections did not exist for certain people”); see also id. at 
1030 n.4 (attributing the term “legal black holes” to Johan Steyn, Guantánamo Bay: The Legal Black Hole, 
53 Int’l & Comp. L.Q. 1, 1 (2004) (U.K.)).
15. See Harold Hongju Koh, Transnational Legal Process, 75 Neb. L. Rev. 181, 196–99 (1996) [hereinafter 
Koh, Transnational Legal Process] (discussing the transnational legal process that initiated the 
extraterritorial return of Haitian and Cuban refugees). See generally Harold Hongju Koh, The Haitian 
Refugee Litigation: A Case Study in Transnational Public Law Litigation, 18 Md. J. Int’l L. & Trade 1 
(1994) [hereinafter Koh, Haitian Refugee Litigation] (discussing transnational legal process in the 
context of the Haitian refugee litigation).
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which international norms infiltrate domestic law.16 Third, the Haitian refugee 
litigation illustrated the evolution of modern-day Civil Procedure, which explains 
why the case is still being used, decades later, as a teaching tool in Procedure classes.17 
Fourth and finally, the case teaches enduring lessons about human rights advocacy, 
as taught through clinical legal education.18
I. HOW THE LITIGATION EVOLVED
 The story of the Haitian refugee litigation has often been told.19 In broadest 
outline, the evolving case echoed first Gideon v. Wainwright,20 then Korematsu v. 
United States,21 and then the tale of the S.S. St. Louis.22
 When the democratically elected government in Haiti was toppled by a military 
coup in 1991, thousands of Haitians started f leeing on the high seas.23 The U.S. 
Coast Guard interdicted their makeshift boats beyond U.S. territorial waters and 
initially “processed” them on Coast Guard cutters, until the volume of cases forced 
their transfer to Guantánamo Bay Naval Base, on the eastern tip of Cuba, for 
“screening”—or preliminary assessment—of their claims of political persecution.24
 After an initial lawsuit failed in the Florida federal courts,25 Yale Law School’s 
Lowenstein Human Rights Clinic filed a successor action in the U.S. District Court 
for the Eastern District of New York that argued, essentially, that the U.S. 
16. See Koh, Transnational Legal Process, supra note 15, at 183–84 (“Transnational legal process describes the 
theory and practice of how public and private actors—nation-states, international organizations, 
multinational enterprises, non-governmental organizations, and private individuals—interact in a 
variety of public and private, domestic and international fora to make, interpret, enforce, and ultimately, 
internalize rules of transnational law.”).
17. See supra notes 2–3 and accompanying text.
18. See Koh & Wishnie, supra note 1, at 426 (“Finally, the story of the [Haitian] litigation reveals important 
lessons for human rights litigation and for contemporary social justice campaigns.”); see also id. at 430 
(“[T]he [Haitian] litigation offers important lessons to clinical legal education, especially as conducted 
by the rapidly growing number of human rights clinics.”). 
19. See sources cited supra note 4.
20. 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
21. 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
22. The tragic story of the S.S. St. Louis is told in the 1974 book, Voyage of the Damned, by Gordon Thomas 
and Max Morgan Witts. See generally Gordon Thomas & Max Morgan Witts, Voyage of the 
Damned (1974).
23. For a description of the 1991 military coup in Haiti, see Brandt Goldstein, Introduction, 61 N.Y.L. Sch. 
L. Rev. (forthcoming Nov. 2016). See also Howard W. French, Haiti Pays Dearly for Military Coup, N.Y. 
Times (Dec. 24, 1991), http://www.nytimes.com/1991/12/25/world/haiti-pays-dearly-for-military-
coup.html (describing “thousands of poor Haitians risking their lives on overcrowded boats to f lee 
repression and hardship” in the aftermath of the 1991 military coup).
24. See Alien Migrant Interdiction, U.S. Coast Guard, https://www.uscg.mil/hq/cg5/cg531/AMIO/amio.
asp (last modified Jan. 12, 2016).
25. Haitian Refugee Ctr. v. Baker, 949 F.2d 1109 (11th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1122 (1992); 
Haitian Refugee Ctr. v. Baker, 953 F.2d 1498 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1122 (1992) (denying 
application for stay of mandate and petition for certiorari).
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government must allow clients to talk to their lawyers and lawyers to talk to their 
clients.26 We challenged the absence of lawyers in repatriation proceedings as 
violations of due process and freedom of political speech. By analogy to Gideon,27 we 
argued that it violated due process to repatriate potential refugees back to possible 
political persecution or death, depriving them of liberty, and possibly life, without 
any legal representation whatsoever.
 As the lawsuit accelerated and the camps expanded, the case increasingly echoed 
Korematsu28: challenging the illegal, indefinite detention of HIV-positive refugees, 
based on their race and nationality, in an offshore prison camp under unconstitutional 
conditions of detention.29 But while that issue was heading to trial, in May 1992, 
President George H.W. Bush signed the “Kennebunkport Order,”30 mandating the 
direct return of all Haitians intercepted on the high seas, regardless of their refugee 
claims. To us, this recalled America’s tragic decision before World War II to turn 
away the S.S. St. Louis, the “Voyage of the Damned,” eventually causing the illegal, 
deliberate, and ultimately fatal, refoulement of Jewish refugees.31
 In our view, such actions violated the plain language of the 1951 Refugee 
Convention32 and the 1980 Refugee Act,33 which had been adopted precisely to 
prevent such tragedies from recurring. But for our litigation team, the timing of this 
outrage could hardly have been worse. President Bush signed the Kennebunkport 
Order the night before Yale Law School’s graduation, just before the third-year 
26. Koh, Haitian Refugee Litigation, supra note 15, at 5–6.
27. In Gideon, the petitioner successfully challenged the trial court’s ruling denying him assistance of 
counsel as a violation of the rights guaranteed him by the Constitution and the Bill of Rights. Gideon v. 
Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 337–45 (1963). See generally Anthony Lewis, Gideon’s Trumpet (1964).
28. In Korematsu, petitioner unsuccessfully challenged his detention at a Japanese-American internment 
camp during World War II. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 217–18 (1944). 
29. About 300 Haitian men, women, and children remained interned on Guantánamo, all with credible 
claims of political persecution, and some with established full-f ledged claims of political asylum. Koh & 
Wishnie, supra note 1, at 410. They were nevertheless barred from entering the United States because 
most had the HIV virus. Id. Title VIII, § 1182(a)(1)(A)(i) of the U.S. Code granted the government 
authority to exclude from admission into the United States persons “determined  .  .  . to have a 
communicable disease of public health significance.” 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(1)(A)(i) (1994).
30. Exec. Order No. 12,807, 57 Fed. Reg. 23,133 (May 24, 1992). The Kennebunkport Order called for the 
U.S. Coast Guard to send all Haitian people interdicted beyond the waters of the United States back to 
Haiti, without the opportunity for INS refugee screening. Haitian Ctrs. Council, Inc. v. Sale, 823 F. 
Supp. 1028, 1033 (E.D.N.Y. 1993). 
31. See generally Thomas & Morgan Witts, supra note 22.
32. Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees art. 33, opened for signature July 28, 1951, 19 U.S.T. 6259, 
6276, 189 U.N.T.S. 150, 176 (entered into force Nov. 1, 1968) (“No Contracting State shall expel or 
return (‘refouler ’) a refugee in any manner whatsoever to the frontiers of territories where his life or 
freedom would be threatened on account of his  .  .  . political opinion.”) (emphasis added). The United 
States became a party to the Refugee Convention when it acceded to the Protocol Relating to the Status 
of Refugees, Jan. 31, 1967, 19 U.S.T. 6223, 606 U.N.T.S. 267.
33. 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h)(1) (1994) (“The Attorney General shall not deport or return any alien  .  .  . to a 
country if the Attorney General determines that such alien’s life or freedom would be threatened in such 
country on account of [his] . . . political opinion.”).
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students who had started the case were about to leave town. Michael Ratner and I 
wondered, “Under these circumstances, should we challenge the order?” But after 
intensive team discussions, we soon concluded that we had little choice: Our country 
was now launching deliberate acts of refoulement after signing a treaty that firmly 
announced that refoulement was prohibited. So if not now, when? If not us, who? And 
if not this, then what?34 No other litigation group was in position to place the 
refoulement issue before a receptive judge as quickly. And if we didn’t challenge this 
as part of our ongoing case, the issue was already lost. We had to send the message 
that someone was ready to fight. Finally, even if we lost in court, at least we would 
have kept the issue alive in the public eye long enough to catalyze other kinds of 
political advocacy.35
 After merciless, round-the-clock litigation, we won both halves of the case before 
the Second Circuit.36 The litigation bifurcated, with the “illegal detention” phase of 
the case (Haitian Centers Council, Inc. v. McNary) proceeding back to trial before the 
courageous Judge Sterling Johnson, Jr.37 Meanwhile, the “direct return” phase of the 
case (Sale v. Haitian Centers Council, Inc.) went on expedited review to the U.S. 
Supreme Court, where we lost 8–1.38 Over Justice Harry A. Blackmun’s powerful 
34. Years later, as Dean of Yale Law School, I recalled this moment when the question arose whether 
military recruiters could come on our campus and interview everybody except the LGBTQ (lesbian, 
gay, bisexual, transgender, questioning) students. We knew that if we challenged that law, Yale 
University could potentially lose millions in government funding. But in a decision strongly urged by my 
late beloved faculty colleague, Robert “Bo” Burt, we nevertheless decided to sue the U.S. government 
for what we thought was illegal conduct and government-compelled speech. See Burt v. Rumsfeld, 322 
F. Supp. 2d 189 (D. Conn. 2004). Again we said, “If not now, when? If not us, who? And if not this, 
then what? If we permit this, could employers come on our campus and announce that they will 
interview Christian, but not Jewish students, or white, but not black students? And even if we lose, 
people will remember who was on the right side of history.” Although the companion challenge lost 
unanimously at the Supreme Court, Rumsfeld v. Forum for Acad. & Inst. Rights, 547 U.S. 47, 70 
(2006), today the U.S. military has abandoned its “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” policy and the Supreme 
Court has embraced the government-compelled speech rationale in a different case. See Agency for Int’l 
Dev. v. All. for Open Soc’y Int’l, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2321 (2013) (holding that the federal government may 
not condition federal funding for HIV prevention on restrictions that require recipients of government 
funds to adopt and express the government’s viewpoint on prostitution as their own). So there is no 
doubt now that we chose the right side of history. As controversial as these decisions may have seemed 
at the time, in retrospect, they were clearly the right thing to do.
35. See generally Ratner, supra note 4 (discussing political advocacy initiatives in the Haitian refugee 
litigation).
36. See Haitian Ctrs. Council, Inc. v. McNary, 969 F.2d 1326 (2d Cir. 1992), vacated as moot sub nom. Sale 
v. Haitian Ctrs. Council, Inc., 509 U.S. 918 (1993).
37. In the years since, Judge Johnson has become a friend to all of us. He and his law clerk, Tawana Davis, 
matched us hour for hour during what became a landmark case for all of us. While Judge Johnson 
maintained scrupulous objectivity during the lengthy litigation, it has since become clear—most 
recently, in his stirring presentation at the New York Law School Storming the Court symposium—that 
the case stands out in his memory as perhaps the most memorable of his storied judicial career.
38. 509 U.S. 155, 158–59 (1993).
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dissent, the Court held that the nonrefoulement provisions of the Immigration and 
Nationality Act and the Refugee Convention did not apply on the high seas.39
 But following a trial skillfully masterminded by Joe Tringali and Lucas 
Guttentag, we won a sweeping due process ruling and a permanent injunction in the 
detention case from Judge Johnson, which to this day remains the strongest opinion 
ever written about the due process rights of alien detainees on Guantánamo.40 Judge 
Johnson wrote: “Although the defendants euphemistically refer to [the] Guantánamo 
operation as a ‘humanitarian camp,’ the facts disclose that it is nothing more than an 
HIV prison camp presenting potential public health risks to the Haitians held 
there.”41 The Clinton administration, which had inherited the Guantánamo detention 
center with visible discomfort, declined to appeal Judge Johnson’s permanent 
injunction and chose to close the facility.42
 Remarkably, after nearly two years of frantic activity, both wings of the case 
ended on the same day.43 On June 21, 1993, the day the Supreme Court disposed of 
both wings of the Haitian case, the government admitted about 205 HIV-positive 
Haitians on Guantánamo into the United States. As the military airplane carrying 
the Haitians appeared over LaGuardia Airport, Michael Ratner and I hugged each 
other on the tarmac, shouting, “The law made this happen!” As the Haitians 
disembarked, they hugged us as we welcomed them to their new country.
 A quarter-century later, two moments stick in my memory. First, inside the 
terminal, one refugee approached me with his name scrawled on a napkin. He 
pointed to the bar-coded “detainee bracelet,” that encircled his wrist like a bar-coded 
piece of meat at a grocery store. He said, “Mon avocat [my lawyer], this is not my 
name.” I realized that the immigration authorities must have misspelled his name 
when he was first picked up on the Coast Guard cutter. “This is my name”—he said, 
pointing vigorously to the name written on the napkin—“Please fix,” he pleaded. I 
turned toward the nearby immigration agents to request the change, when suddenly 
I realized that yes, the law had made this happen. All his legal rights to live in 
America keyed off of Judge Johnson’s court order, which relying on the official U.S. 
immigration records, had similarly misspelled his name. It was just too risky to 
change all that now. So I turned back to my client and said, “This is your Ellis 
Island. This is your name now.” He seemed puzzled and asked, “So what is your 
name?” I paused and answered, “When we first came here, they spelled it ‘K-O-H.’” 
He looked at me blankly for a moment, then brightened. “So this is my name!” he 
39. Id. at 159.
40. See Haitian Ctrs. Council, Inc. v. Sale, 823 F. Supp. 1028 (E.D.N.Y. 1993).
41. Id. at 1038–39.
42. For a discussion of how the trial judgment came to be vacated, see Goldstein, supra note 2, at 298–
301, and infra text accompanying notes 176–186.
43. See Sale, 509 U.S. 155.
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announced to everyone, and as my own parents had done, he went off to start his 
new life in America.44
 Like so many of the lawyers and law students in the case, I have stayed in touch 
with some of those Haitians who finally made it to the United States (including 
Wadson Fortune, who attended the New York Law School symposium). I have seen 
Guantánamo refugee children grow up to serve in the U.S. armed forces, raise U.S. 
citizen families, and make extraordinary contributions to American life. Their 
odysseys always remind me of my own Korean family’s journey to citizenship and 
membership in what Reverend Martin Luther King, Jr. called America’s “Beloved 
Community.”45 I will not forget attending one graduation ceremony for a 
“Guantánamo graduate” at a high school in Mattapan, Massachusetts. Our former 
client, now fully Americanized, swaggered across the stage to get his diploma, baggy 
pants and basketball shoes showing below his graduation robes. Perturbed, the 
woman sitting next to me muttered: “What on earth will become of that boy?” I 
touched her arm and said, “Ma’am, I’ll bet you that someday, he becomes the Dean 
of Yale Law School.”
II. LEGAL BLACK HOLES?
 The Haitian case asked a simple, chilling legal question: “Are there legal ‘black 
holes,’ law-free zones, to which no law applies?” With respect to Guantánamo, in the 
detention phase of the case, Judge Johnson concluded “no.”46 “If the Due Process 
Clause does not apply to the detainees at Guantánamo,” he wrote, the government 
“would have discretion deliberately to starve or beat them, to deprive them of medical 
attention, to return them without process to their persecutors, or to discriminate 
among them based on the color of their skin.”47
 But Justice John Paul Stevens’ opinion for eight Justices in the Haitian case gave 
a startlingly different answer: The statutory and treaty obligations of nonrefoulement 
do not apply on the high seas.48 But if this were literally true, why couldn’t refugees 
44. For a more expansive discussion about the months that preceded the Supreme Court’s decision, and the 
difficult conditions faced by refugees held in the Guantánamo camp during that time, see Koh, Haitian 
Refugee Litigation, supra note 15, at 12–14.
45. See The King Philosophy, King Ctr., http://www.thekingcenter.org/king-philosophy#sub4 (last visited 
Nov. 7, 2016) (“‘The Beloved Community’ is a term that was first coined in the early days of the 20th 
Century by the philosopher-theologian Josiah Royce, who founded the Fellowship of Reconciliation. 
However, it was Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., also a member of the Fellowship of Reconciliation, who 
popularized the term and invested it with a deeper meaning which has captured the imagination of 
people of goodwill all over the world.”).
46. Haitian Ctrs. Council, Inc. v. Sale, 823 F. Supp. 1028, 1042 (E.D.N.Y. 1993).
47. Id. The court also held that the U.S. government had violated American lawyers’ First Amendment 
rights by denying them access to the Haitians for the purpose of counseling, advocacy, and representation, 
id. at 1040–41, and that the defendants had abused their statutory authority under the Administrative 
Procedure Act by conducting unauthorized asylum interviews on Guantánamo and denying parole to 
the screened-in Haitians. Id. at 1045–49.
48. Sale, 509 U.S. at 158–59.
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also be tortured or summarily executed on the high seas without violating human 
rights law? Clearly troubled by his own ruling, Justice Stevens acknowledged the 
“moral weight” of the Haitians’ claim.49 Still, he concluded: “Although the human 
crisis is compelling, there is no solution to be found in a judicial remedy.”50
 Justice Blackmun’s powerful dissent replied that the refugee treaty and statute 
must apply extraterritorially if they were to achieve their object and purpose: that 
“[v]ulnerable refugees shall not be returned.”51 If the high seas were truly a black hole, 
he suggested, the U.S. government could repatriate aliens from the high seas operating 
outside the law altogether. Choosing a black hole approach thus implicates the 
profound question of whether we are governed by a rule of law at all.
 Although I greatly admire Justice Stevens, I have set forth at length elsewhere 
why his opinion is full of legal errors.52 As Justice Blackmun’s dissent carefully 
chronicles, the majority ignored the text, object, purpose, and negotiating and 
legislative history of the treaty.53 The Court began the elevation of a canon of statutory 
construction—the presumption against extraterritoriality—to near-iconic status.54 
The majority unduly deferred to executive power.55 And it effectively created a black 
hole in international refugee law with regard to refugees seized on the high seas.56
 In the end, the majority reached its result by f latly ignoring the double plain 
meaning of the statute and treaty, thereby articulating an unprecedented domestic 
49. Id. at 178–79.
50. Id. at 188 (quoting Haitian Refugee Ctr. v. Gracey, 809 F.2d 794, 841 (D.C. Cir. 1987)).
51. Id. at 190 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
52. See Koh, The “Haiti Paradigm,” supra note 4, at 2416–23.
53. Sale, 509 U.S. at 188–98 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
54. See id. at 173–88 (majority opinion). The Court’s obsession with the presumption against extraterritoriality 
has continued. See, e.g., William S. Dodge, Morrison’s Effects Test, 40 Sw. L. Rev. 687 (2011); William S. 
Dodge, The Presumption Against Extraterritoriality After Morrison, 105 Am. Soc’y Int’l L. Proc. 396 
(2011); William S. Dodge, The Presumption Against Extraterritoriality in Two Steps, 110 Am. J. Int’l L. 45 
(2016); William S. Dodge, Understanding the Presumption Against Extraterritoriality, 16 Berkeley J. Int’l 
L. 85 (1998); William S. Dodge, International Comity Run Amok, Just Security (Feb. 3, 2015, 9:22 AM), 
https://www.justsecurity.org/19640/international-comity-run-amok/; William S. Dodge, The Presumption 
Against Extraterritoriality Does Not Apply to Jurisdictional Statutes, Opinio Juris (Jan. 28, 2014, 12:00 PM), 
http://opiniojuris.org/2014/01/28/guest-post-dodge-presumption-extraterritoriality-apply-jurisdictional-
statutes/; William S. Dodge, The Presumption Against Extraterritoriality Still Does Not Apply to Jurisdictional 
Statutes, Opinio Juris (July 1, 2016, 4:57 PM), opiniojuris.org/2016/07/01/32658/; William S. Dodge, 
Will Filartiga Survive?, Just Security (Sept. 15, 2015, 1:00 PM), https://www.justsecurity.org/26064/
filartiga-survive/.
55. Sale, 509 U.S. at 187–88 (“That presumption [against extraterritoriality] has special force when we are 
construing treaty and statutory provisions that may involve foreign and military affairs for which the 
President has unique responsibility.” Id. at 188).
56. Mark S. von Sternberg, Reconfiguring the Law of Non-Refoulement: Procedural and Substantive Barriers 
for Those Seeking to Access Surrogate International Human Rights Protection, 2 J. on Migration & Hum. 
Security 329, 333 (2014) (“The damage done by the Sale decision is difficult to assess. One of its chief 
effects was to create a legal ‘black hole’ with respect to interdiction on the high seas where there was, 
according to the court, no law, and hence refugees could have no rights.”).
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rule of “territorial nonrefoulement.”57 Most striking about Justice Stevens’ opinion is 
its agonized tone,58 which strongly suggests that he was assigned to write the opinion 
as the least persuaded Justice.
 To learn the backstory of Justice Stevens’ opinion, Mike Wishnie and I dug into 
the official papers of our late boss, Justice Harry A. Blackmun, now housed at the 
Library of Congress. In the case file, we found a remarkable memo by the late Justice 
Antonin Scalia, announcing: “I object to the Court’s mention of the moral weight of 
the Haitians’ claim. For my taste, that comes too close to acknowledging that it is 
morally wrong to return these refugees to Haiti, which I do not believe.”59 Justice 
Stevens responded: “I think it is undeniable it has some moral weight and I think it 
would be unfortunate for us to imply that we think it may have none.”60
 But Justice Blackmun did not give up. Shortly after authoring the Sale dissent, he 
essentially invited other global juridical bodies to reconsider the ruling. In a speech 
to the American Society of International Law, he said: “To allow nations to skirt 
their solemn treaty obligations and return vulnerable refugees to persecution simply 
by intercepting them in international waters is . . . to turn the Refugee Convention 
into a ‘cruel hoax.’”61 “We perhaps can take some comfort in the fact that although 
the Supreme Court is the highest court in the land, its rulings are not necessarily the 
final word on questions of international law.”62
 More than two decades later, the international legal community seems to have 
accepted Justice Blackmun’s invitation and rejected the holding of the Haitian case. 
Other human rights groups pressed arguments similar to those urged by the Sale 
plaintiffs in challenging the U.S. government’s policy before the Inter-American 
57. As Justice Blackmun’s law clerk Andrew Schapiro (later President Obama’s ambassador to the Czech 
Republic) wrote in his pre-argument bench memo: 
The longer I work on this case, the more convinced I become that the Gov[ernment’s] 
statutory interpretation argument may not even pass the “straight-face” test . . . . There 
is nothing at all ambiguous about the [statutory] language: it clearly and explicitly 
forbids the Gov[ernmen]t from returning any alien to his persecutors. Is that what the 
Gov[ernmen]t is doing here? Unquestionably. That should be the end of the case, on 
the merits.
 Bench Memorandum from Andrew Schapiro to Justice Harry A. Blackmun 35 (Feb. 27, 1993) (on file 
with Library of Congress). To hold otherwise, the majority had to assume the impossible:
that Congress did not mean what it said when it ratified a mutually reinforcing statute 
and treaty: that the negotiating parties intended, through f loor debate, to undercut the 
treaty’s explicit object and purpose and that Congress had enacted universal human 
rights obligations governing trans-border activities with an exclusively territorial focus.
 Koh & Wishnie, supra note 1, at 405 –06.
58. See supra notes 48–49 and accompanying text.
59. Letter from Justice Antonin Scalia to Justice John Paul Stevens 1 (May 20, 1993) (on file with author).
60. Letter from Justice John Paul Stevens to Justice Antonin Scalia 1 (May 20, 1993) (on file with author).
61. Harry A. Blackmun, The Supreme Court and the Law of Nations, 104 Yale L.J. 39, 44 (1994) (citation 
omitted).
62. Id. at 42.
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Commission on Human Rights. That body declared: “The Commission shares the 
view advanced by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees in its Amicus 
Curiae brief in its argument before the Supreme Court, that Article 33 had no 
geographical limitations.”63 The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees in 
turn decided that he considered the Court’s decision in the Haitian case a “setback to 
modern international refugee law,” because “the obligation not to return refugees to 
persecution arises irrespective of whether governments are acting within or outside 
their borders.”64 Later, in an advisory opinion issued in January 2007, the High 
Commissioner expressly rejected the Supreme Court’s argument, stating: “UNHCR 
is of the view that the majority opinion of the Supreme Court in Sale does not 
accurately reflect the scope of Article 33(1) of the 1951 Convention.”65 In stating this 
conclusion, the High Commissioner followed Justice Blackmun’s dissenting reading 
of the text and negotiating history of the Refugee Convention.66
63. Haitian Ctr. for Human Rights v. United States, Case 10.675, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., Report No. 
51/96, OEA/Ser.L./V/II.95, doc. 7 rev. ¶ 157 (1997); see also Petitioners Release Resolution of the Inter-
American Commission on Human Rights Concerning U.S. Program of Haitian Refugee Interdiction, 32 
I.L.M. 1215 (1993) (discussing Case 10.675). 
64. UN High Commissioner for Refugees Responds to U.S. Supreme Court Decision in Sale v. Haitian Centers 
Council, 32 I.L.M. 1215, 1215 (1993).
65. U.N. High Comm’r for Refugees, Advisory Opinion on the Extraterritorial Application of Non-
Refoulement Obligations Under the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and Its 1967 Protocol, 
¶ 24 n.54 (Jan. 26, 2007), http://www.refworld.org/pdfid/45f17a1a4.pdf.
66. The High Commissioner added: 
UNHCR is of the view that the purpose, intent and meaning of Article 33(1) of the 
1951 Convention are unambiguous and establish an obligation not to return a refugee 
or asylum-seeker to a country where he or she would be [at] risk of persecution or other 
serious harm, which applies wherever a State exercises jurisdiction, including at the 
frontier, on the high seas or on the territory of another State.
 . . . .
 Thus, an interpretation which would restrict the scope of application of Article 
33(1) of the 1951 Convention to conduct within the territory of a State party . . . would 
not only be contrary to the terms of the provision as well as the object and purpose of 
the treaty under interpretation, but it would also be inconsistent with relevant rules of 
international human rights law. It is UNHCR’s position, therefore, that a State is 
bound by its obligation under Article 33(1) of the 1951 Convention not to return 
refugees to a risk of persecution wherever it exercises effective jurisdiction. As with 
non-refoulement obligations under international human rights law, the decisive criterion 
is not whether such persons are on the State’s territory, but rather, whether they come 
within the effective control and authority of that State. 
 Id. ¶¶ 24, 43.
Far from being irrelevant to U.S. judicial interpretation, the UNHCR’s interpretation of its own 
treaty has been found by the U.S. Supreme Court to “provid[e] significant guidance in construing the 
[1951 Refugee] Protocol, to which Congress sought to conform. It has been widely considered useful in 
giving content to the obligations that the Protocol establishes.” INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 
439 n.22 (1987) (discussing U.N. High Comm’r for Refugees, Handbook on Procedures and Criteria for 
Determining Refugee Status Under the 1951 Convention and the 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of 
Refugees (1979)).
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 In the intervening years, other courts have largely rejected the Haiti case as 
inconsistent with human rights principles.67 To be sure, a few national courts have 
sided with Sale68: But most courts have prudently taken a different view. In M70/2011 
v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship, the High Court of Australia ruled that 
asylum seekers interdicted off of Australia could not be sent to Malaysia for off-shore 
processing.69 In Jamaa v. Italy, the European Court of Human Rights held that it 
followed from Italy’s “de facto control” over Libyan migrants that the Italian 
authorities should have known that the migrants would be exposed in Libya to 
treatment in breach of the European Convention, namely refoulement to persecution.70 
The court also held that the Convention’s prohibition on collective expulsion applies 
to removal undertaken outside a state’s territory.71 The European Court similarly 
ruled in M.S.S. v. Belgium & Greece.72 And a consensus seems to be developing in the 
European courts that the high seas are not legal black holes. Medvedyev v. France 
ruled in 2010 that “the special nature of the maritime environment relied upon by the 
Government in the instant case cannot justify an area outside the law where ships’ 
crews are covered by no legal system . . . .”73 In Khlaifia v. Italy, the European Court 
further held that the detention of Libyan migrants on Lampedusa was unlawful 
because the migrants had not been notified of the reasons for the detention, there was 
no statutory basis, they were unable to challenge it, and the conditions of the detention 
facility had diminished their human dignity.74 In sum, over time the arguments that 
the Supreme Court’s Sale ruling rejected have largely prevailed elsewhere.75
67. See infra notes 69–75 and accompanying text; see also Koh & Wishnie, supra note 1, at 424 (“The Haitian 
interdiction program was almost uniquely discriminatory, in which the Coast Guard stopped Haitian 
boats on the high seas pursuant to the 1981 United States–Haiti Accord, a rare agreement that provided 
no general authority for the Coast Guard to intercept and return refugees from other countries for 
whom no such accord exists.”).
68. These include the UK House of Lords in the Roma Rights case, R v. Immigration Officer at Prague 
Airport [2004] UKHL 55, [2005] 2 AC 1 (HL) (appeal taken from Eng.), the Federal Court of 
Australia in the Tampa case, Ruddock v Vadarlis (2001) 110 FCR 491 (Austl.), and the Spanish Tribunal, 
Tribunal Supremo, in the 2010 Marine I case, S.T.S., Feb. 17, 2010 (J.T.S., No. 833) (Spain). 
69. (2011) 244 CLR 144 (Austl.).
70. 2012-II Eur. Ct. H.R. 97.
71. Id. ¶¶ 70–82, 186.
72. 2011-I Eur. Ct. H.R. 255 (establishing standards for the treatment of asylum seekers, including an 
obligation for Member States to ensure that human rights are respected even when transferring an 
individual to another Member State).
73. 2010-III Eur. Ct. H.R. 259, ¶ 81. 
74. App. No. 16483/12, ¶¶ 83–84, 91–94, 135 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Sept. 1, 2015), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/
eng?i=001-157277. 
75. “These rulings increasingly treat Sale as isolated state practice, due little deference, based on an 
unexplained asymmetry of authority: that somehow, national governments need not take the bitter with 
the sweet. They can claim a legal right to exercise governmental authority extraterritorially without any 
accompanying extraterritorial legal constraint.” Koh, supra note 6.
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 If the courts have largely rejected the claim that the high seas are a legal black 
hole, what about Guantánamo? During the Haitian case, Judge Johnson firmly 
rejected that notion in a ruling later vacated by settlement in order to secure the 
release of the hostages from Guantánamo.76 Given that all manner of federal law 
applies on Guantánamo, from environmental regulation of iguanas to the federal 
Anti-Slot Machine Act,77 it would truly be bizarre if the Bill of Rights had no 
application to human beings who are held in the exact same place.
 But less than a year later, a circuit split arose.78 As the Haitian refugee crisis was 
winding down, in July 1994, Fidel Castro responded to popular protests by allowing 
more than 30,000 Cuban refugees to flee toward America on makeshift rafts, relying 
on longstanding U.S. refugee policy granting asylum (and eventually permanent 
residence and citizenship) to such individuals under the Cuban Adjustment Act of 
1966.79 In September 1994, pursuant to an unusual accord with Fidel Castro, President 
Bill Clinton “ordered that illegal refugees from Cuba will not be allowed to enter the 
United States [and instead] will be taken to our naval base at Guantánamo.”80 A group 
of prominent Cuban-American attorneys, again assisted by Yale’s Lowenstein 
International Human Rights Clinic, sued the Clinton administration in Miami 
federal court, seeking to enjoin the U.S. government from involuntarily repatriating 
Guantánamo detainees back to Cuba.81
 At the hearing on the temporary restraining order, I was stunned to hear a U.S. 
government lawyer baldly assert that the Cubans who are in safe haven at 
Guantánamo are without rights under our Constitution or any other U.S. laws.82 So I 
argued in response that “the basic principles of our government are first, the 
government is limited [in] its power and second, persons have rights and what you 
76. Haitian Ctrs. Council, Inc. v. McNary, No. 92 CV 1258, 1992 WL 155853, at *6 (E.D.N.Y. Apr. 6) 
(“Although Guantánamo Naval Base is located in Guantánamo Bay, Cuba, it is subject to the exclusive 
jurisdiction of the United States pursuant to a lease and treaty agreement. Therefore, the First 
Amendment is applicable to United States conduct on Guantánamo.”), aff ’d in part, vacated in part, 969 
F.2d 1326, 1340 (2d Cir. 1992) (“The unique facts of this case—namely, the interdiction of plaintiffs by 
United States officials, the status of the territory upon which they are detained, and the ‘credible’ asylum 
claim they have already been found to possess—lead us to believe that the district court properly issued 
a preliminary injunction upon finding that there were serious questions going to the merits of the 
‘screened in’ plaintiffs’ fifth amendment claims.”), vacated as moot sub nom. Sale v. Haitian Ctrs. Council, 
Inc., 509 U.S. 918 (1993).
77. 15 U.S.C. § 1175 (2012); Installation of Slot Machs. on U.S. Naval Base, Guantánamo Bay, 6 Op. 
O.L.C. 236, 242 (1982); Transcript of Oral Argument at 52, Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004) (No. 
03-334) (statement of Souter, J.) (“We even protect the Cuban iguana.”).
78. See infra note 86 and accompanying text.
79. Pub. L. No. 89-732, 80 Stat. 1161 (1966) (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1255 (2012)); Koh & 
Wishnie, supra note 1, at 417. 
80. The President’s News Conference, 30 Weekly Comp. Pres. Doc. 1682, 1683 (Aug. 19, 1994).
81. CABA v. Christopher, No. 94-2183-CIV-ATKINS (S.D. Fla. Oct. 24, 1994). I served as counsel of 
record for the Cuban detainees in the CABA case.
82. Transcript of Hearing at R5:27–73, CABA v. Christopher, No. 94-2183-CIV-ATKINS (S.D. Fla. Oct. 
26, 1994).
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heard today is that the government has limitless power and these people have no 
rights and that cannot be the law.”83 Although the trial judge similarly rejected the 
government’s claims,84 in Cuban American Bar Ass’n (CABA) v. Christopher, the 
Eleventh Circuit reversed, holding that “these [Cuban and Haitian] migrants are 
without legal rights that are cognizable in the courts of the United States.”85 In so 
holding, the Eleventh Circuit expressly parted from the Second Circuit’s reasoning 
regarding the legal rights of noncitizens detained at Guantánamo.86 Yet read literally, 
the Eleventh Circuit’s ruling that “the First Amendment does not apply to the 
migrants or to the lawyers at Guantánamo Bay”87 would permit the U.S. government 
to bar American citizens on Guantánamo not just from speaking to their Cuban 
clients, but also from speaking to other Americans there, and to punish Americans 
on Guantánamo for writing open letters, criticizing the president, or even engaging 
in religious worship.88 
 In contrast, the Haitian rulings acknowledged that “although Guantánamo Bay 
Naval Base lies outside the formal borders of the United States, in all other senses, it 
83. When I stood up, I said: 
We hold these truths to be self-evident that all men are born with certain inalienable 
rights including [that] no person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without 
due process of law. It doesn’t say no citizen[,] it says no person and Congress shall make 
no law abridging the freedom of speech, the executive branch shall not . . . even at the 
request of Fidel Castro limit or abridge the freedom of speech of U.S. citizens who are 
trying to convey a viewpoint. Your honor, the basic principles of our government are 
first, the government is limited [in] its power and second, [that] persons have rights and 
what you heard today is that the government has limitless power and these people have 
no rights and that cannot be the law. And if they say to you that’s not your job, I would 
say to you, Your Honor, that’s exactly your job. Government power f lows from the 
Constitution and can’t be exercised in violation of the Constitution so, all you have to 
do, Your Honor, is, do your job, which is not to tell them what they must do, but to tell 
them what they may not do: [namely,] violate the Constitution laws of the United States.
 Id.; CABA v. Christopher: 20th Anniversary of the Cuban Rafters in Guantánamo, U. Miami Libr.: 
Mediaspace, at 1:07:28 (Feb. 16, 2015), https://umiami.mediaspace.kaltura.com/media/CABA+v.+Ch
ristopherA+20th+Anniversary+of+the+Cuban+Rafters+in+Guantanamo/1_3qtht2dp/24745431 
(reciting this part of the hearing transcript).
84. See CABA v. Christopher, 43 F.3d 1412, 1420 (11th Cir. 1995) (citing Order Granting Plaintiffs’ 
Emergency Motion for Temporary Restraining Order, CABA v. Christopher, No. 94-2183-CIV-
ATKINS (S.D. Fla. Oct. 31, 1994)). 
85. Id. at 1430.
86. Compare Haitian Ctrs. Council, Inc. v. McNary, 969 F.2d 1326 (2d Cir. 1992) (affirming the preliminary 
injunction because plaintiffs were likely to succeed on their constitutional claims), vacated as moot sub 
nom. Sale v. Haitian Ctrs. Council, Inc., 509 U.S. 918 (1993), with CABA, 43 F.3d 1412 (denying that 
Cuban and Haitian migrants have rights).
87. CABA, 43 F.3d at 1429.
88. These examples are not merely hypothetical. In March 1995, for example, U.S. authorities on 
Guantánamo apparently excluded paintings by Cuban refugees from a Guantánamo art show because 
they were critical of U.S. policy. Pamela S. Falk, Trapped in Cuba, N.Y. Times, Apr. 15, 1995, at 19.
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‘feels’ like America.”89 Over time, thousands of foreign nationals have been employed 
as laborers at Guantánamo—including Cubans, Jamaicans, and Filipinos—who 
would be left without legal recourse by the Eleventh Circuit’s ruling.90
 In effect, the CABA case ruling by the Eleventh Circuit invited the U.S. 
government to establish an offshore “rights-free zone” on Guantánamo. Although 
American detention camps are not a new phenomena, especially for refugees, after 
the CABA case, the probability grew that Guantánamo would be used as a long-term 
offshore detention facility, and treated as a legal black hole.91 Throughout the 1990s, 
the U.S. government repeatedly used Guantánamo as a holding center for thousands 
of asylum seekers captured at sea from Haiti, Cuba, and even China.92 In the spring 
of 1999, during the Kosovo Crisis, the Clinton administration brief ly considered 
placing 20,000 Kosovar refugees on Guantánamo.93 The administration ultimately 
89. Koh & Wishnie, supra note 1, at 418. “The United States provides the only law and is accountable there 
only to itself. Of all the U.S. overseas military bases, only Guantánamo lacks a Status of Forces 
Agreement that defines the allocation of civil and criminal jurisdiction over military and other 
personnel.” Id. at 418–19; see also Matthew Hay Brown, Oldest U.S. Base Overseas Harbors Hometown 
Feel, Orlando Sentinel, Dec. 22, 2003, at A1 (describing how Guantánamo has “assumed the look 
and feel of smalltown America”). “The base is entirely self-sufficient, with its own water plant, schools, 
transportation, and entertainment facilities.” Wayne S. Smith, The Base from the U.S. Perspective, in 
Subject to Solution: Problems in Cuban-U.S. Relations 97, 98–99 (Wayne S. Smith & Esteban 
Morales Dominguez eds., 1988). In 2003, the base commander described it as “small-town America.” 
Carol Rosenberg, New Chief Brings Guantánamo up to Date, Miami Herald, Oct. 25, 2003, at 15A. 
There were detention facilities “hidden away in a restricted area, behind armed checkpoints, several 
ridgelines from downtown.” Brown, supra. See generally Christina M. Frohock, Small-Town 
GTMO (2016).
90. Koh & Wishnie, supra note 1, at 419 (citing Associated Press, In Cuba, U.S. Relies on Low-Paid Help of 
Non-Americans, Com. Appeal (Memphis), Feb. 1, 2002, at A7 (noting presence of 1,000 foreign 
workers); Filipino Residents Register to Vote, 63 Guantánamo Bay Gazette 4 (2006) (noting that 700 
Philippine nationals on Guantánamo registered to vote in their home country)). As I noted in an earlier 
work: “Historically, the parallel judicial treatment of the Panama Canal Zone and the Trust Territory of 
the Pacific Islands—both non-sovereign territories under the complete jurisdiction and control of the 
United States—also recognized the application of fundamental constitutional rights to foreign nationals 
within those territories.” Koh & Wishnie, supra note 1, at 419. For a definitive account of these historical 
precedents, see Gerald L. Neuman, Closing the Guantánamo Loophole, 50 Loy. L. Rev. 1, 15–34 (2004).
91. Such camps include the infamous World War II internment camps into which more than 110,000 
Japanese-Americans were relocated and detained. See Koh & Wishnie, supra note 1, at 419 n.136 (citing 
Peter Irons, Justice at War (1983)). In the mid-1970s, the U.S. government employed several military 
bases within the United States as sites for emergency housing, processing, and resettlement of thousands 
of refugees f leeing Vietnam. Id. The 1980 Mariel “Freedom Flotilla” brought 125,000 Cubans to the 
United States. Id. (citing Ronald Copeland, The Cuban Boatlift of 1980: Strategies in Federal Crisis 
Management, 467 Annals Am. Acad. Pol. & Soc. Sci. 138 (1983)). Since the late 1980s, the INS has 
detained thousands of Central American refugees in border facilities and tent-shelters in rural areas in 
Arizona, California, South Texas, as well as in federal detention facilities in Louisiana and Florida. Id. 
(citing Koh, Refugee Camps, supra note 4, at 140).
92. See, e.g., United States v. Li, 206 F.3d 56, 69 n.1 (1st Cir. 2000) (Torruella, C.J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part) (noting the government’s use of Guantánamo as an interim detention center for 
interdicted Chinese). I should disclose that during that period, I represented pro bono a Chinese refugee 
brought to Guantánamo on the Golden Venture.
93. Koh & Wishnie, supra note 1, at 419–20.
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withdrew the plan, largely on the basis of opposition from those of us working in the 
U.S. government who had lived through the Haitian refugee debacle.94 In the early 
days of the Bush administration, the Justice Department’s Office of Legal Counsel 
presciently concluded, after a review of existing case law, that “[a] detainee could 
make a non-frivolous argument that [habeas] jurisdiction does exist over aliens 
detained at [Guantánamo Bay, Cuba], and we have found no decisions that clearly 
foreclose the existence of habeas jurisdiction there.”95
 Still, soon after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, President George W. 
Bush chose to bring more than 700 alleged Al Qaeda detainees held in Afghanistan 
to Guantánamo, with no apparent exit strategy.96 Guantánamo then became a subject 
of heated international debate about America’s commitment to human rights.97 Many 
of the lawyers who first learned of Guantánamo during the original Haitian cases 
stepped forward to protest the post-9/11 use of Guantánamo.98
 In three plenary cases regarding such detainees that went to the U.S. Supreme 
Court, the Bush administration unsuccessfully denied that noncitizen detainees have 
meaningful legal rights on Guantánamo.99 In 2002, when the Bush administration 
started bringing Al Qaeda detainees to Guantánamo, Michael Ratner filed Rasul v. 
Bush, the f irst lawsuit challenging President Bush’s wartime detentions on 
Guantánamo.100 In 2004, the Supreme Court ruled for the detainees, holding that 
noncitizen detainees on Guantánamo have a right to file statutory writs of habeas 
corpus to challenge their detention.101 Writing for the Rasul Court, Justice Stevens 
stated that “the United States exercises exclusive jurisdiction and control” at 
Guantánamo.102 In his concurring opinion, Justice Anthony Kennedy agreed that 
94. Id.; Philip Shenon, U.S. Chooses Guantánamo Bay Base in Cuba for Refugee Site, N.Y. Times (Apr. 7, 
1999), http://www.nytimes.com/1999/04/07/world/crisis-balkans-haven-us-chooses-guantanamo-bay-
base-cuba-for-refugee-site.html.
95. Memorandum from Patrick F. Philbin & John C. Yoo, Deputy Assistant Att’ys Gen., Office of Legal 
Counsel, to William J. Haynes II, Gen. Counsel, U.S. Dep’t of Def., Possible Habeas Jurisdiction over 
Aliens Held in Guantánamo Bay, Cuba 1 (Dec. 28, 2001).
96. Koh & Wishnie, supra note 1, at 420; see, e.g., Diane Marie Amann, Guantánamo, 42 Colum. J. 
Transnat’l L. 263, 267 (2004).
97. Koh & Wishnie, supra note 1, at 420. For arguments opposed to the U.S. detention policy in 
Guantánamo, see Joseph Margulies, Guantánamo and the Abuse of Presidential Power 
(2006); Michael Ratner & Ellen Ray, Guantánamo: What the World Should Know (2004); 
and David Rose, Guantánamo: The War on Human Rights (2004).
98. This group included Michael Ratner, Lucas Guttentag of the ACLU, Professors Sarah Cleveland of 
Columbia, Mike Wishnie and myself from Yale, Gerry Neuman of Harvard, and many others.
99. Koh & Wishnie, supra note 1, at 420–22 (discussing Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723 (2008); Hamdan 
v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557 (2006); and Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004)).
100. See Cole, supra note 9.
101. Rasul, 542 U.S. 466. I served as counsel on an amicus brief filed in support of the detainees in Rasul. See 
Brief Amici Curiae of Former U.S. Gov’t Officials in Support of Petitioners, Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 
466 (2004) (Nos. 03-334, 03-343), 2004 WL 96757.
102. Rasul, 542 U.S. at 476.
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“Guantánamo Bay is in every practical respect a United States territory.”103 And 
Justice Stevens ruled that the presumption against extraterritoriality of U.S. law did 
not apply at Guantánamo because petitioners were being “detained within ‘the 
territorial jurisdiction’ of the United States.”104 Thus, the Supreme Court, led, 
ironically, by the Justice who had authored the direct return decision against the 
Haitian boat people, had finally ruled that noncitizen detainees do in fact have legal 
rights on Guantánamo.
 Two years later, the Court decided Hamdan v. Rumsfeld,105 and again ruled, on 
jurisdiction and on the merits, in favor of an alleged “enemy combatant” held at 
Guantánamo.106 The Hamdan Court rejected the administration’s effort to characterize 
Hamdan as a person outside the law, following its insistence in Rasul107 that 
Guantánamo must be treated as a place subject to law.108 Hamdan flatly denied that 
Hamdan’s detention on Guantánamo rendered him a person held in an extralegal zone, 
who could be subjected to the jurisdiction of a noncourt military commission.109 While 
acknowledging that Hamdan might have committed serious crimes, the Court 
declared, “in undertaking to try Hamdan and subject him to criminal punishment, the 
Executive is bound to comply with the rule of law that prevails in this jurisdiction.”110 
Thus, the Court rebuffed the government’s core premise that 9/11 had created a black 
hole requiring that ordinary legal rules be jettisoned in Hamdan’s case.111
103. Id. at 487 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment).
104. Id. at 480 (majority opinion) (citation omitted).
105. 548 U.S. 557 (2006).
106. Koh & Wishnie, supra note 1, at 421. Justice Stevens, again writing for the Court, “found the President’s 
Nov. 2001 Military Commissions Order unauthorized by either his constitutional Commander-in-
Chief power or the September 2001 Authorization of Use of Military Force Resolution.” Id. The Court 
also “ruled that the Order violated the Uniform Code of Military Justice . . . , which calls for military 
commissions to be [as similar as] ‘practicable’” to statutory courts-martial “and Common Article 3 of 
the Geneva Conventions of 1949, which set minimum universal standards for treatment of detainees, 
including trials before ‘regularly constituted courts.’” Id.
107. Rasul, 542 U.S. 466. The Court refused to accept the Bush administration’s extreme claim regarding 
the authority of the Executive under the Constitution and invalidated a military proceeding against a 
noncitizen detainee on Guantánamo as unauthorized by law, calling President Bush’s military 
commission an “extraordinary measure raising important questions about the balance of powers in our 
constitutional structure.” Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 567.
108. Koh & Wishnie, supra note 1, at 421.
109. Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 574–76.
110. Id. at 635.
111. Koh & Wishnie, supra note 1, at 421. Justice Kennedy stated in concurrence, “a case that may be of 
extraordinary importance is resolved by ordinary rules,” Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 637 (Kennedy, J., 
concurring in part), and described the most relevant rules as “those pertaining to the authority of 
Congress and the interpretation of its enactments.” Id. He argued that “[r]espect for laws derived from 
the customary operation of the Executive and Legislative Branches gives some assurance of stability in 
time of crisis. The Constitution is best preserved by reliance on standards tested over time and insulated 
from the pressures of the moment.” Id.; Koh & Wishnie, supra, at 421 n.150.
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 Following the Court’s decision in Hamdan, Congress quickly passed the Military 
Commissions Act of 2006 (MCA),112 which renewed the President’s authority to try 
“alien unlawful combatants,” including those held on Guantánamo, before military 
commissions.113 But in Boumediene v. Bush, the Supreme Court again ruled against 
the government, acknowledging the long history of judicial precedent regarding 
Guantánamo, and holding that fundamental constitutional limitations, particularly 
the Suspension Clause, apply to foreign nationals detained there.114 Writing for the 
Court, Justice Kennedy definitively rejected the notion that Guantánamo is a black 
hole.115 If noncitizens would have a constitutional right to the writ of habeas corpus 
only on the sovereign territory of the United States, he wrote, it would effectively 
grant the political branches “the power to switch the Constitution on or off at will,” 
depending on where noncitizen detainees were moved.116 Instead applying a 
“functional approach” based on “practical concerns, not formalism,”117 Justice 
Kennedy reasoned that provisions of the Bill of Rights—such as the Suspension 
Clause—should apply to Guantánamo unless it was proved “impracticable or 
anomalous” to apply them.118 Going forward, then, Guantánamo cannot be a legal 
black hole; instead, Boumediene’s “impractical or anomalous” test should determine 
which constitutional rights aliens should enjoy there.
 The Supreme Court’s ruling territorially limiting an apparently universal human 
rights treaty, namely the Refugee Convention, raised a further question: whether 
such an “extraterritorial black hole” would apply to other universal human rights 
treaties. Two decades later, I again faced this issue during my time as Legal Adviser 
of the State Department during the Obama administration. Although the United 
States had ratified the Convention Against Torture (CAT or “Torture Convention”) 
more than twenty years earlier, when asked in 2006 if all provisions of the torture 
treaty applied without exception, the Bush administration had answered, in effect, 
“no, some provisions do not apply either outside U.S. territory or in times of armed 
conflict.”119 As Charlie Savage of the New York Times recounts, when I left the State 
112. Pub. L. No. 109-366, 120 Stat. 2600 (2006) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 10, 18, 28, 
and 42 U.S.C.).
113. Koh & Wishnie, supra note 1, at 422. The MCA provides that
[n]o court, justice, or judge shall have jurisdiction to hear or consider an application for 
a writ of habeas corpus filed by or on behalf of an alien detained by the United States 
who has been determined by the United States to have been properly detained as an 
enemy combatant or is awaiting such determination.
 28 U.S.C. § 2241(e)(1) (2012).
114. 553 U.S. 723, 770–71 (2008).
115. See id. at 771.
116. Id. at 765.
117. Id. at 726–27.
118. Id. at 770.
119. Harold Hongju Koh, America’s “Unequivocal Yes” to the Torture Ban, Just Security (Nov. 18, 2014, 9:52 
AM), https://www.justsecurity.org/17551/americas-unequivocal-yes-torture-ban/.
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Department in January 2013, I left behind two detailed memorandum opinions that 
challenged that conclusion.120 Those opinions explained why, notwithstanding the 
Haitian refugee case, both the Torture Convention and the International Covenant 
for Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) have extraterritorial application.121 In 
preparing these detailed opinions, which amounted to more than 140 single-spaced 
pages, I worked closely with another member of Team Haiti, my counselor on 
international law, Sarah Cleveland (now a Columbia Law Professor and U.S. member 
on the Human Rights Committee of the ICCPR). 
 My Torture Convention opinion unequivocally declared that it simply was “not 
legally available to policymakers” to claim that the CAT did not apply outside the 
United States.122 Yet the internal debate on this question within the administration 
continued for another two years, and the United States declined to change its position 
regarding the territorial application of the ICCPR.
 But happily, in 2014, the Obama administration finally embraced the universal 
prohibition of torture in its presentation before the Committee Against Torture in 
Geneva. Assistant Secretary of State for Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, 
Tom Malinowski, stated that the torture ban applies “in all places, at all times, with 
no exceptions.”123 My former principal deputy, then Acting Legal Adviser for the 
U.S. Department of State, Mary McLeod, echoed the same notion, now embedded 
into U.S. law.124 The Obama administration finally answered, as a legal matter, that: 
“There should be no doubt, the United States affirms that torture and cruel, 
inhuman, and degrading treatment and punishment are prohibited at all times in all 
places, and we remain resolute in our adherence to these prohibitions.”125 So while in 
the Haitian refugee case, we could not close by judicial decision a black hole in the 
Refugee Convention, decades later, we succeeded in closing a parallel gap in the 
Torture Convention by executive interpretation. The United States f inally 
120. Charlie Savage, U.S. Seems Unlikely to Accept That Rights Treaty Applies to Its Actions Abroad, N.Y. Times, 
Mar. 7, 2014, at A6; Harold Hongju Koh, Legal Adviser, U.S. Dep’t of State, Memorandum Opinion 
on the Geographic Scope of the Convention Against Torture and Its Application in Situations of 
Armed Conflict (Jan. 21, 2013) [hereinafter Koh, CAT Memo]; Harold Hongju Koh, Legal Adviser, 
U.S. Dep’t of State, Memorandum Opinion on the Geographic Scope of the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights (Oct. 19, 2010) [hereinafter Koh, ICCPR Memo]. 
121. Savage, supra note 120; Koh, CAT Memo, supra note 120; Koh, ICCPR Memo, supra note 120. 
122. Koh, CAT Memo, supra note 120, at 6. When I left the State Department, I left behind a second 
memorandum that argued that the ICCPR also applied extraterritorially. Koh, ICCPR Memo, supra 
note 120; see also Savage, supra note 120; Marko Milanovic, Harold Koh’s Legal Opinions on the US 
Position on the Extraterritorial Application of Human Rights Treaties, Ejil: Talk! (Mar. 7, 2014), http://
www.ejiltalk.org/harold-kohs-legal-opinions-on-the-us-position-on-the-extraterritorial-application-
of-human-rights-treaties/.
123. Tom Malinowski, Assistant Sec’y of State for Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, U.S. Dep’t of 
State, Opening Statement Before the Committee Against Torture (Nov. 12–13, 2014). 
124. Mary E. McLeod, Acting Legal Adviser, U.S. Dep’t of State, Opening Statement Before the Committee 
Against Torture (Nov. 12–13, 2014).
125. Id.
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acknowledged, with regard to torture, that a human rights treaty applies anywhere 
under U.S. governmental authority, including Guantánamo.
 Nor, finally, is there a black hole in these treaties to exempt counterterrorism or 
armed conflict situations. For legal purposes, it does not matter that Al Qaeda or 
other terrorist groups have not signed the Torture Conventions or the Geneva 
Conventions. I recall one meeting I had about ten years ago with a senator who said, 
“Professor, the last time I checked, Al Qaeda hadn’t signed either the Torture 
Convention or the Geneva Conventions.” I told him, “Senator, the last time I 
checked, the whales hadn’t signed the Whaling Convention either!”126 My point was 
that this is not about contract or bilateral agreement, but rather, about the minimal 
standards of humane treatment we must obey unilaterally, whether or not there is a 
written agreement. Whether or not we are fighting terrorists, and whether or not the 
terrorists agree to follow it, the norm of humane treatment binds us, as a defining 
element of our national identity. Senator John McCain put it well when he said, “it’s 
not about them; it’s about us.”127 America’s president-elect has recently argued that 
our government should return to waterboarding or “a hell of a lot worse than 
waterboarding.”128 But to be clear: The Torture Convention expressly says that 
torture may not be justified by a state of war or a threat of war and that all acts of 
torture, wherever they can occur, must be criminalized.129 So to return to “worse 
than waterboarding” would be illegal behavior, and if an elected president ordered it, 
after taking an oath to uphold the Constitution and laws of the United States, that 
order would probably constitute a high crime and misdemeanor, and hence, an 
impeachable offense.130
126. I later repeated this point in my Senate testimony. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld: Establishing a Constitutional 
Process: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 51 (2006) (statement of Harold Hongju 
Koh, Dean, Yale Law School) (“Some have said, well, terrorists have not signed Common Article 3. 
Well, whales have not signed the Whaling Convention. But it is about how we treat them and how we 
are obliged to treat them.”). 
127. Foster Klug, McCain: Torture Ban Protects U.S. Image, Wash. Post (Nov. 14, 2005, 7:10 AM), http://
www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/11/14/AR2005111400247.html. 
128. Tom McCarthy, Donald Trump: I’d Bring Back ‘a Hell of a Lot Worse Than Waterboarding,’ Guardian 
(Feb. 7, 2016, 6:57 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2016/feb/06/donald-trump-
waterboarding-republican-debate-torture. Mr. Trump reaffirmed the sentiment months later. See 
Andrea Germanos, Donald Trump Vows Torture (Again): ‘I Like Waterboarding a Lot,’ Common Dreams 
(June 29, 2016), http://www.commondreams.org/news/2016/06/29/donald-trump-vows-torture-again-
i-waterboarding-lot.
129. Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment art. 2, 
adopted Dec. 10, 1984, S. Treaty Doc. No. 100-20 (1988), 1465 U.N.T.S. 112.
130. U.S. Const. art. II, § 4 (“The President, Vice President and all civil Officers of the United States, shall 
be removed from Office on Impeachment for, and Conviction of, Treason, Bribery, or other high 
Crimes and Misdemeanors.”); Al Shimari v. CACI Premier Tech., Inc., No. 15-1831, 2016 WL 
6135246, at *10 (4th Cir. Oct. 21, 2016) (Floyd, J., concurring) (“While executive officers can declare 
the military reasonableness of conduct amounting to torture, it is beyond the power of even the President 
to declare such conduct lawful.  .  .  . The fact that the President—let alone a significantly inferior 
executive officer—opines that certain conduct is lawful does not determine the actual lawfulness of that 
conduct. The determination of specific violations of law is constitutionally committed to the courts, 
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 Nor does the United States’ revised reading of the Torture Convention suggest that 
the existence of armed conflict creates a legal black hole for human rights treaties.131 
The George W. Bush administration had “articulated a complete displacement theory 
of lex specialis, taking the position that international humanitarian law (IHL) entirely 
displaced operation of the CAT in situations where IHL applies.”132 Under this theory, 
the Torture Convention’s substantive provisions would not apply to U.S. activities in 
armed conflict, and the CAT Committee would have no jurisdiction to examine such 
activities.133 Combined with the Bush administration’s position that certain Torture 
Convention provisions did not apply extraterritorially, this position doubly insulated 
U.S. government activities outside the United States, including on Guantánamo, from 
CAT Committee oversight.134 But the State Department’s Acting Legal Adviser, Mary 
McLeod, revised this position for the government, responding to a question from the 
Committee by saying,
[T]he clear position of the United States is that torture and cruel, inhuman 
and degrading treatment or punishment are legally prohibited everywhere 
and at all times. There can also be no question that these prohibitions continue to 
apply even when the United States is engaged in armed conflict. These prohibitions 
exist under domestic and international law, including human rights law and 
the Law of Armed Conflict.135
Acting Legal Adviser McLeod stated: “Whether you are looking at human rights 
law or the [Law of Armed Conf lict], the prohibition against torture and cruel 
treatment is categorical. There are no gaps.”136 By so saying, the Obama delegation 
explicitly changed the U.S. government’s official position, pushed the Bush 
administration position aside, and made progress toward recognizing the application 
of the treaty both extraterritorially and in armed conflict.
 In sum, since the Haitian refugee case, the United States had generally argued 
for strict territoriality in human rights treaties, without regard to their substance, 
while the rest of the world—without reaching consensus on what the precise legal 
test for geographic scope should be—had uniformly acknowledged some kind of 
extraterritorial reach for those same treaties. This stark difference in legal views had 
left the United States increasingly isolated from the rest of the human rights world. 
even if that law touches military affairs.”); see also Harold Hongju Koh, Can the President Be Torturer in 
Chief?, 81 Ind. L.J. 1145, 1148, 1156 (2006).
131. See Sarah Cleveland, The United States and the Torture Convention, Part II: Armed Conflict, Just 





135. CAT 53rd Session—United States of America, UN Treaty Body Webcast, at 16:38 (Nov. 12, 2014), 
http://www.treatybodywebcast.org/cat-53rd-session-united-states-of-america/#podPressPlayerSpace_3 
(emphasis added), quoted in Cleveland, supra note 131 (emphasis added).
136. Cleveland, supra note 131.
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The 2015 CAT presentation marked the first time in more than two decades that 
the United States had moved away from a strict territorial reading of a human rights 
treaty. Now that the United States has finally joined the rest of the world in 
acknowledging that some human rights treaty obligations must extend beyond our 
shores, we can finally engage with our treaty partners to seek consensus, with respect 
to our various human rights treaty obligations, on what the most legally correct 
interpretation of that geographic scope should be.137 That engagement should lead to 
a sounder, more durable relationship between the United States and the rest of the 
international human rights system.
 Stepping back a quarter century after the Haitian refugee case, what is today’s 
report card on legal black holes? Despite the Haitian refugee case, the high seas are 
not a black hole. Guantánamo is not a black hole. The Torture Convention does 
apply extraterritorially, as well as to terrorists, and in situations of armed conflict. 
Obviously, there is more work to be done. But after a quarter century, that’s not 
really such a bad report card after all.
III. TRANSNATIONALISM AND TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL PROCESS
 What is the Haiti case’s legacy for transnationalism? One commentator has called 
“transnational legal theory” “the dominant theory of international law” since the 
1990s.138 The same commentator traces the rise of that theory to the Haitian refugee 
case.139 He continues:
This theory combines a descriptive account of the nature and function of 
international law with a normative account of its justification. Descriptively, 
the fundamental move of transnationalism is to collapse the traditional 
distinction between domestic and international law. Normatively, 
transnationalism’s basic tenet is that collapsing this distinction is desirable.
 Transnationalism appeared with the end of the Cold War and to some 
extent partook in optimism about the “end of history.” Its normative vision 
focuses on the enforcement of human rights. This focus has been important 
137. As Sarah Cleveland noted, the Bush “complete displacement” theory has finally been discarded:
Taken together, these various statements make clear that the U.S. is articulating a new 
and much narrower approach: CAT obligations “remain applicable  in times of armed 
conf lict and are  reinforced  by complementary prohibitions in the [Law of Armed 
Conflict],” and although “the more specialized laws of war . . . take precedence over the 
Convention where the two conflict, the laws of war do not generally displace the Convention’s 
application.”  The United States therefore articulated a welcome and substantially 
refined vision of the relationship between IHL and the CAT, in which the terms of the 
CAT presumptively  apply,  except in the quite specific case of an express conf lict 
between IHL and a particular CAT provision.
 Id. (alteration in original) (citation omitted).
138. Itamar Mann, Dialectic of Transnationalism: Unauthorized Migration and Human Rights, 1993–2013, 54 
Harv. Int’l L.J. 315, 315 (2013).
139. “For better or worse, Haiti provided a paradigm for international law in the next two decades. The 
model of law that came out of the Haiti affair, combining bilateral relations, a treaty, and a domestic 
court, later migrated outside of the United States.” Id. at 328.
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not only in producing scholarly insight but also in framing human rights 
policy considerations by governments.140
 Conceptually, the notion of transnationalist law breaks into “transnational legal 
process”—the legal process of interaction, interpretation, and rule-internalization that 
breeds hybrid international-domestic law rules141—and “transnational legal substance,” 
the hybrid rules of law that emerge from that process. For several decades, I have 
argued that this transnational legal process enforces human rights law by creating 
pressure on nations that flout international law rules to come back into compliance 
with those rules over time. Because law-abiding states incorporate international law 
into their domestic legal and political structures, over time international law becomes 
an internal constraint.142 Compliance becomes the political path of least resistance.143 
Thus, when a state violates international law, such violation creates frictions and 
contradictions that restrict and limit the state’s ongoing participation in the 
transnational legal process.144 Transnational public lawsuits of the Haitian refugee 
litigation kind are designed to provoke judicial action that will create such frictions, 
helping to shift the normative direction of governmental policies toward legality.145
 The aftermath of the Haitian case arguably proves this thesis. One legacy of the 
Haitian case was that the 205 HIV-positive Guantánamo detainees won, although as 
discussed further below, we traded away the judicial precedent in our favor as the 
price of settlement. Another legacy is that the boat people lost, but additional testing 
of the Supreme Court’s normative outcomes in other parts of the world have yielded 
a different governing rule that closed black holes elsewhere.146 Despite the nationalism 
of the U.S. Supreme Court, the Haitian case gave new energy to transnational legal 
process by suggesting, as Justice Blackmun did, that the domestic court’s “rulings are 
not necessarily the final word on questions of international law.”147 Put another way, 
“don’t get mad, litigate!”
 The Supreme Court’s adverse Haitian ruling did not end, but rather, motivated 
the transnational legal process toward closing black holes that I have elsewhere 
described: It forced advocates to gain more legal and factual knowledge, to assemble 
transnational legal and advocacy networks to relitigate the same issue elsewhere, to 
argue in favor of a better norm, to search for better law-declaring fora, and to seek 
issue linkages and strategies of bureaucratic compliance that would promote 
140. Id. at 315–16 (footnotes omitted).
141. See Harold Hongju Koh, Why Do Nations Obey International Law?, 106 Yale L.J. 2599, 2603 (1997); see 
also Harold Hongju Koh, Why Transnational Law Matters, 24 Penn St. Int’l L. Rev. 745 (2006).
142. See Harold Hongju Koh, Transnational Legal Process, supra note 15, at 204. 
143. Id.
144. Id. at 207. 
145. Id.
146. See discussion supra Part II, pp. 15–19.
147. Blackmun, supra note 61, at 42.
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internalization of those norms over time.148 While the migration of Haitian refugees 
into the United States led governments to seek new ways to create legal black holes, 
it equally inspired a generation of law students and human rights advocates to keep 
those black holes closed.149 It did so by giving them legal arguments, strategic tools, 
and process insights that have helped them counter those arguments in other parts of 
the world.150
 A shorthand term for the strategy that human rights advocates and scholars 
pursued during and since the Haitian refugee case is “LawFAIR.”151 LawFAIR 
stands for “(1) crystallizing Lawful norms, claims, and precedent, before (2) a 
receptive Forum, aided by (3) coalitions that cleverly combine Assets and Allies; as well 
as (4) [creating] Issue Linkages between the human rights claim and related issues 
affecting the adversary, all in search of (5) achievable Remedies and Relief.”152 What 
the Haitian refugee case teaches, looking back, is that well-crafted LawFAIR 
strategies may entail more than political compromises.153 If committed advocates 
persist long enough, the better legal position should ultimately prevail. The 
international rulings reviewed above show that over the course of several decades, 
decisions by the highest national court “are no longer final stops, but only way 
stations, in the process of ‘complex enforcement’ triggered by transnational public 
law litigation.”154 “European civil rights litigants have long understood that adverse 
national court decisions may be ‘appealed’ to and even ‘reversed’ by the European 
Court of Human Rights” or the Court of Justice of the European Union.155
 Thus, all nations that regularly participate in transnational legal interactions will 
eventually come into greater compliance with international law.156 Through this 
complex transnational legal process of rational self-interest and norm internalization—
148. See Harold Hongju Koh, Bringing International Law Home, 35 Hous. L. Rev. 623 (1998).
149. Koh, supra note 6.
150. Id. 
151. By so saying, I describe a desirable human-rights promoting practice that is distinct from the pejorative 
term “Lawfare,” sometimes used by opponents of human rights litigation to describe advocacy efforts to 
require actors in wartime to follow norms of human rights and humanitarian law.
152. Koh, supra note 6.
153. Id. (“Advocates may learn the lessons of ‘repeat play’ to deploy tools of process to harness politics and 
promote global policies based on better human rights principle.”). But see Mann, supra note 138, at 365 
(arguing that transnational legal process solutions tend to lead to political compromises, instead of clean 
human rights results).
154. See Koh, The “Haiti Paradigm,” supra note 4, at 2406; see also Mark W. Janis, An Introduction to 
International Law 263–64 (2d ed. 1993) (describing the European Court’s decision in the Sunday 
Times Case, 30 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1979), in which the European Court issued a ruling in favor of 
the Sunday Times, despite eight out of eleven English judges having ruled against the newspaper at 
various stages of the litigation)).
155. Koh, The “Haiti Paradigm,” supra note 4, at 2406.
156. See id. One implication of this argument is that “hermit nations,” rogue nations like North Korea, Cuba, 
and Burma, must be engaged and brought into the transnational legal process to socialize them into the 
processes of international law observance. See generally Ryan Goodman & Derek Jinks, Socializing 
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spurred by transnational litigation—international legal norms become entrenched in 
domestic legal and political processes.157 In this way, international law inf luences 
how national governments manage international relations.158
 Closer to home, the Haitian case exposes an ongoing struggle within our 
Supreme Court between a group of Justices I call the “transnationalists” and another 
group of “nationalist” Justices. These groups exhibit very different judicial 
philosophies in their attitudes toward the world. As I have elsewhere enumerated:
•  Transnationalist judges tend to look to U.S. interdependence, 
whereas nationalist judges tend to look to U.S. autonomy.
•  Transnationalist judges tend to think about how U.S. law fits 
into a framework of transnational law, while nationalists see a 
rigid foreign and domestic divide.
•  Transnationalist judges think that courts can domesticate 
international law, whereas nationalists think that only the 
political branches are legally empowered to do so.
•  Transnationalist judges look to the development of a global legal 
system, while nationalists tend to focus more narrowly on the 
development of a national legal system.
•  Transnationalist judges believe that executive power can be 
constrained by comity [doctrines and] courts, while nationalists 
believe acts of executive discretion should enjoy great deference.159
 The strong and enduring transnational tradition in American jurisprudence runs 
through Chief Justices John Marshall and John Jay, who arguably wrote as many 
opinions about international as about domestic law; through Justice Horace Gray, 
who wrote the classic cases of the Paquete Habana160 and Hilton v. Guyot;161 through 
Chief Justices Melville Fuller and William Howard Taft, who helped to found the 
American Society of International Law; through Justice William O. Douglas, who 
traveled the world to an extent unmatched by any Justice in our history; through 
Justice William J. Brennan, Jr., the strongest internationalist on the Warren Court, 
States: Promoting Human Rights Through International Law (2013) (discussing how to 
encourage states to respect human rights through the transnational legal process).
157. Koh, The “Haiti Paradigm,” supra note 4, at 2406; Harold Hongju Koh, International Law and 
International Relations: The State of the Dialogue (1994) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author) 
(expanding on the assertion made here); see also Abram Chayes & Antonia Handler Chayes, On 
Compliance, 47 Int’l Org. 175 (1993) (providing a study of compliance issues).
158. See Koh, The “Haiti Paradigm,” supra note 4, at 2406; see also Chayes & Chayes, supra note 157, at 187.
159. Harold Hongju Koh & William Michael Treanor, A Community of Reason and Rights, 77 Fordham L. 
Rev. 583, 596 (2008); see also Harold Hongju Koh, Transnational Litigation in United States 
Courts 247–48 (2008) (discussing transnational jurisprudence). 
160. 175 U.S. 677 (1900).
161. 159 U.S. 113 (1895).
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and Justice Byron White, who wrote the stirring transnationalist dissent in Banco 
Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino;162 through the leader of transnationalism on the 
Burger Court, my old boss Harry A. Blackmun, who wrote the prescient dissent in 
the Haitian refugee case.163 Today, Justice Stephen Breyer, in his judicial writings 
and recent book, The Court and the World,164 has taken the lead among the current 
Justices on the Roberts Court in paying the “decent respect to the opinions of 
mankind” that our Declaration of Independence called for in 1776.165
 Through the early days of the Roberts Court, as in so many other public law 
areas, the Justices generally split 4–1–4 on transnational issues, with Justice Kennedy 
providing the swing vote. But with the passing of Justice Antonin Scalia (and the 
obstructed nomination of Chief Judge Merrick Garland to fill his seat), it remains 
unclear in which direction our own Court will now move. At this writing, it can only 
be predicted that the Court’s future will depend critically upon who the forty-fifth 
president manages to seat on the Court. While the surprise election of Donald 
Trump leaves many questions unanswered, and a long way to go before his influence 
on the Court’s composition is fully felt, the Court now seems most likely to move in 
a more nationalist direction.
IV. THE HAITI CASE AND THE EVOLUTION OF CIVIL PROCEDURE
 The Haitian refugee litigation also signaled the twenty-first century evolution of 
Civil Procedure, now expressed through three different notions of adjudication: 
private, public, and transnational.166 In first-year Civil Procedure class, we have 
traditionally studied the private law adjudication that characterized a simpler world, 
dominated by bipolar, adversarial, private law adjudication based on private claims, 
simple party structures, and passive judicial decisionmakers who focus less on 
announcing broad statements of public principle, than on resolving disputes of little 
public consequence by awarding retrospective damages.167
 But over the last quarter-century, the world of Procedure has been buffeted by 
rapid changes in technology, the rise of interest group politics, regulation and the 
administrative state, the pervasiveness of alternative dispute resolution and the 
globalization of markets, rights, and communication. These changes have given rise 
to two newer types of complex litigation.
 The first is domestic “public law litigation” of the kind that Abe Chayes celebrated 
and that Owen Fiss described as “structural reform litigation” or “institutional reform 
162. 376 U.S. 398, 439 (1964) (White, J., dissenting).
163. Koh & Treanor, supra note 159, at 596. 
164. Stephen Breyer, The Court and the World (2015).
165. The Declaration of Independence para. 1 (U.S. 1776).
166. See generally Harold Hongju Koh, The Just, Speedy, and Inexpensive Determination of Every Action?, 162 
U. Pa. L. Rev. 1525 (2014), from which this discussion derives.
167. This traditional mode of adjudication is classically described in Lon L. Fuller, The Forms and Limits of 
Adjudication, 92 Harv. L. Rev. 353 (1978).
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litigation.”168 Domestic public law litigation, unlike private law adjudication, is 
prospectively focused, and characterized by complex claims and structures, as well as 
inquiring active judges who use injunctive powers to fix wrongful systems, with their 
goal being as much enunciation of public norms as it is resolution of private disputes.169
 The Haitian refugee litigation exemplified a second kind of complex public 
litigation that now arises frequently in a globalizing world: “transnational public law 
litigation.”170 As I have elsewhere described, in these kinds of cases, “transnational 
litigants bring a transnational party structure and a transnational claims structure into 
domestic court.”171 The resulting complex litigation paradigms have tested core 
architectural assumptions about whether a single set of Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 
can still ensure “the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action.”172
 Since the late 1970s, human rights lawyers have used transnational public law 
litigation as a way to challenge systematic human rights violations and to seek 
enunciation of transnational norms. These lawyers, personified by my late friend 
Michael Ratner, have shrewdly deployed LawFAIR strategies173 to invoke complex 
public claims and complex party structures to pursue injunctions in domestic court. 
Their ultimate aim has been less to win in private dispute resolution as it has been to 
give voiceless underdogs a voice in a U.S. court by creating a political bargaining 
chip, which can in turn be bargained in exchange for other kinds of meaningful 
relief. In this litigation setting, the role of the judge—the exemplar being Sterling 
Johnson, Jr. in the Haitian refugee case—is not passive and retrospective, but active 
and inquiring, focused on the future.
 The endgame of the Haitian refugee litigation graphically illustrated transnational 
legal process in action. After a bench trial, Judge Johnson declared the HIV camp 
unconstitutional and entered a permanent injunction ordering the release of the 
168. Abram Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 Harv. L. Rev. 1281 (1976); Abram 
Chayes, The Supreme Court, 1981 Term—Foreword: Public Law Litigation and the Burger Court, 96 Harv. 
L. Rev. 4 (1982); Owen M. Fiss, The Supreme Court, 1978 Term—Foreword: The Forms of Justice, 93 
Harv. L. Rev. 1 (1979).
169. Koh, supra note 166, at 1530 (expanding this assertion and listing prisons and hospitals as examples of 
such wrongful systems). A variant of public law litigation is mass tort litigation: ostensibly private 
lawsuits that are now increasingly suffused with the public interest. Id. While such cases seek to sort out 
large-scale disasters, toxic torts, and products liability imbroglios through tort litigation, they have 
generally been resolved by the creation and distribution of mass tort compensation funds administered 
by special matters—such as the 9/11 Fund, the BP Oil Spill Fund, and the Boston Marathon case. Id. 
170. Harold Hongju Koh, Transnational Public Law Litigation, 100 Yale L.J. 2347, 2348 (1991); see also Harold 
Hongju Koh, Civil Remedies for Uncivil Wrongs: Combatting Terrorism Through Transnational Public Law 
Litigation, 22 Tex. Int’l L.J. 169 (1987) (highlighting the role of transnational public law litigation).
171. Koh, supra note 166, at 1530. By bringing these transnational claim and party structures into domestic 
courts, transnational litigants “help generate judgments that can be used as judicially created bargaining 
chips in other political fora, with their aim generally being norm enunciation and transportation of those 
norms to trigger institutional dialogue with political actors and to effect changes in public policy.” Id. 
172. Id. at 1531.
173. See supra text accompanying notes 152–53.
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refugees to anywhere but Haiti.174 Since no other nation would accept the Haitian 
refugees, this order was effectively a directive to allow them to enter the United 
States.175 If the Haitians had not prevailed at trial, they would have never been 
admitted.176 But all counsel involved also understood that the trial win, standing 
alone, would not secure the refugees’ release.177 The government had the right to 
appeal to the Second Circuit, and even if it did not secure a stay pending appeal from 
the appellate court, it would likely have won another one from the Supreme Court.178 
And even if the Second Circuit had affirmed the trial decision, the Haitians’ counsel 
knew that another grant of certiorari and eventual reversal by the Supreme Court 
could easily happen.179 Because Judge Johnson’s injunction was a “wasting asset,” with 
limited half-life, the Haitians’ lawyers finally chose to trade it before it disappeared, 
in exchange for the Haitian detainees’ entry into the United States.180 But the 
government would not agree to the trade unless we also agreed to vacate, by settlement, 
Judge Johnson’s path-breaking judicial precedent holding that aliens on Guantánamo 
had due process rights.181 I, for one, initially balked, thinking that we might need that 
precedent in the future.182 But my colleagues soon convinced me that there was no 
real choice: Our duty to our clients demanded that we put their personal freedom 
first. And so with a slight tactical delay, we accepted the government’s deal and the 
Guantánamo Haitians finally came into the United States.183
 What we did not appreciate at the time was that the trade was a “win-win,” 
because the Clinton administration was also looking for a way out of the Haitian 
conundrum. As one official involved in the decision to admit the Haitians later 
recalled, senior leaders in the Clinton administration had “no desire” to continue to 
detain refugees on Guantánamo and thus no real eagerness to appeal and seek a 
stay.184 Public and congressional reaction opposed a unilateral executive branch 
decision to admit the refugees, but Judge Johnson’s injunction supplied the 
government with a face-saving opportunity to avoid stay or appeal, while “resolv[ing] 
174. Haitian Ctrs. Council, Inc. v. Sale, 823 F. Supp. 1028, 1050 (E.D.N.Y. 1993).
175. Koh & Wishnie, supra note 1, at 426.
176. Id.
177. Id. at 427.
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. Goldstein, supra note 2, at 298–99.
181. Id. at 299.
182. It turned out we did, when Al Qaeda suspects were brought to Guantánamo, and we had to litigate 
these issues all over again. See supra Part II.
183. See Goldstein, supra note 2, at 288, 300. As Goldstein notes, we accepted the government’s vacatur 
agreement only after Judge Johnson’s opinion had irrevocably been published in the hardbound volume of 
the Federal Supplement and all electronic databases, where it remains available for citation. Id. at 300.
184. Koh & Wishnie, supra note 1, at 427 (citing Telephone Interview by Michael J. Wishnie with Eric P. 
Schwartz, Former Nat’l Sec. Council Staff Member (Jan. 2, 2008)).
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the situation in a humanitarian way.”185 Accordingly, the refugees were admitted to 
the United States and resettled in New York and southern Florida by early July 1993. 
Despite some skepticism by the advocacy community that the Haitian refugee 
litigation had been nothing more than “a time-consuming, resource-intensive, 
lawyer-dominated process played out before a conservative judiciary,” the outcome of 
the case proved that transnational public law litigation can play a crucial part in 
delivering individual justice to voiceless underdogs.186
 Increasingly, such transnational cases are playing a growing role in our Procedure 
curriculum. As any first-year law student knows, today’s Civil Procedure canon now 
includes such international cases as Goodyear,187 McIntyre,188 Helicopteros,189 Asahi,190 
Schlunk,191 Aérospatiale,192 Bremen v. Zapata,193 and Piper v. Reyno.194 But at the same 
time, other cases in the canon ruling against human rights plaintiffs on grounds of 
subject matter jurisdiction,195 personal jurisdiction,196 or inadequate pleading197 all 
show that the Supreme Court retains considerable skepticism toward the broader 
project of transnational public law litigation. In the long run, these restrictive 
readings of procedural rules may end up having serious substantive impacts, 
particularly if a Trump presidency moves the Court rightward.
 As Steve Burbank and Sean Farhang have recently shown, restrictive readings of 
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure have considerably limited meaningful private 
enforcement of public policy.198 Had today’s iconic Procedure case, Iqbal v. Ashcroft 
(which imposed a higher level of pleading through judicial interpretation) been the 
law, the Haitian refugee case might never have made it into court at all.199 Going 
forward, human rights lawyers will need to monitor procedural interpretations closely 
to ensure that insensitive judicial enforcement of procedural rules does not foster 
185. Id.
186. Id. at 426–27.
187. Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915 (2011).
188. J. MacIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 564 U.S. 873 (2011).
189. Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408 (1984).
190. Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102 (1987).
191. Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft v. Schlunk, 486 U.S. 694 (1988).
192. Société Nationale Industrielle Aérospatiale v. U.S. Dist. Court, 482 U.S. 522 (1987).
193. 407 U.S. 1 (1972).
194. 454 U.S. 235 (1981). For a review of many of these decisions, see generally Koh, supra note 159.
195. E.g., Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659 (2013).
196. E.g., Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746 (2014).
197. E.g., Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009).
198. Stephen B. Burbank & Sean Farhang, Litigation Reform: An Institutional Approach, 162 U. Pa. L. Rev. 
1543, 1583–1612 (2014).
199. See Koh, supra note 166, at 1531.
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inequality of treatment among similarly situated parties or discourage underdogs 
from meaningful litigation.
V. HUMAN RIGHTS ADVOCACY AND CLINICAL LEGAL EDUCATION
 Finally, what are the legacies of the Haitian refugee litigation for human rights 
advocacy and clinical education? The Haitian refugee story shows, as Itamar Mann 
has argued, that “[t]ransnationalism’s ideals have fueled legal initiatives to protect 
human rights internationally and have encouraged law students to participate in 
international human rights clinics and choose human rights-oriented careers.”200 
One legacy of the litigation has been an energized human rights advocacy movement, 
reinforced by a new generation of what Deena Hurwitz has named “inevitable” 
human rights clinics.201 The Haitian refugee litigation  inspired advocacy strategies 
that enlist “inside” and “outside” politics, combining transnational public law 
litigation with popular movement politics.202 These advocacy strategies have inspired 
law professors to expand experiential learning in law schools and to create a new 
generation of “live-client” human rights clinics that reengage in the real world with 
amicus briefs, arguments, and blog posts.203 This reengagement has been spurred on 
by the rise of information networks through the World Wide Web, the explosion of 
social media, and the ensuing globalization of transnational human rights networks.204 
 Sadly, committed human rights advocates too often fail to achieve their desired 
results “because they cannot manage politics, harness incentives and institutions, or 
deploy law in a way that operationalizes the principles they value.”205 But as I have 
noted elsewhere, “an increasingly rich transnational legal process has created multiple 
new avenues for ‘clinical trials,’ whereby practitioners can test arguments that have 
not fully succeeded in one forum in another, more sympathetic venue”206 in search of 
better human rights outcomes.
200. Mann, supra note 138, at 316.
201. See Deena R. Hurwitz, Lawyering for Justice and the Inevitability of International Human Rights Clinics, 
28 Yale J. Int’l L. 505, 508 (2003). 
202. For an explanation of inside and outside politics, see Koh & Wishnie, supra note 1, at 427–28.
203. Koh, supra note 6. For example, after working as a law student on the Haitian case, Mike Wishnie went 
on to co-found an innovative immigrants’ rights clinic at New York University and later at Yale Law 
School. Goldstein, supra note 2, at 304. Most recently, following the November 2016 election, Mike 
Wishnie and I, now as faculty colleagues, decided that it was time to co-found yet another Rule of Law 
clinic at Yale to monitor the incoming Trump administration’s fidelity to the rule of law in such areas as 
counterterrorism, antidiscrimination, and climate change.
204. As I have noted elsewhere, “[a]ll of this has been given new impetus by the academy’s response to human 
rights issues raised by the so-called ‘Global War on Terror,’ a role analogous to the one played by the 
public law academy during the Civil Rights Revolution.” Koh, supra note 6.
205. Id.
206. Id. (“Because human rights advocates are by their nature ‘forum-shoppers’ and because globalization has 
generated a growing set of fora in which the same legal issues can be contested, human rights scholars 
and advocates now have repeated opportunities to work together, through repeated lawsuits, to find 
better fora in which to crystallize norms and leverage legal rulings into meaningful policy change.”).
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 From the inception of the Haitian refugee litigation in early spring 1992, counsel 
litigated the case both inside and outside the courtroom. From the start, we played 
the “inside game,” reaching out to sympathetic officials in both the Bush and Clinton 
administrations.207 But at the same time, we pursued an “outside” advocacy strategy—
complementary to our litigation strategy—which sought allies in the media and 
political elites, and among local government officials, students, and grassroots 
activists willing to take these issues to the streets. Over the litigation’s eighteen-
month course, members of Team Haiti made numerous telephone calls and traveled 
to Washington to lobby Congress and their staff, and to meet and strategize with 
influential AIDS, civil rights, and human rights NGOs; pitched story after story to 
the national media;208 and collaborated with prominent civil rights and entertainment 
leaders on high-profile public events.209 The legal team also pursued a bottom-up, 
grassroots strategy that included engagement with local AIDS and Haitian activists 
in New York City. Yale law students started a campaign of campus hunger strikes 
that resulted in local media coverage across the country.210 This strategy resulted in 
local protests and surprisingly large media coverage, coupled with outreach to 
municipal officials in New York, Boston, Seattle, and elsewhere, who came to 
support the resettlement of the refugees by offering the Clinton administration the 
local political support necessary to enable the Haitians’ release after trial.211 The 
Haitian refugee case thereby reaffirmed that public law litigation does not occur in a 
vacuum, and that courtroom victories alone cannot achieve lasting change without 
genuine social internalization of the norms being contested.212
 Engaging the public and political debate for an extended period proved vital to 
winning the human rights struggle. Between the years 1992 and 1993, advocates for 
the f leeing Haitian refugees failed to persuade the public—whether the elites within 
the Clinton administration and Congress, or the wider American population at a 
grassroots level—of the “moral weight” and practical advisability of providing 
sanctuary to those f leeing persecution.213 But “by 1994, the ‘inside/outside advocacy’ 
game had finally helped turn the political tide in the refugees’ favor, which made a 
different political solution possible.”214 This same general lesson reappeared in the 
post-9/11 Guantánamo advocacy, which over a number of years deployed a blend of 
207. Koh & Wishnie, supra note 1, at 427–28.
208. See id. at 428 & n.174.
209. See Ratner, supra note 4, at 217.
210. Id. at 215.
211. Koh & Wishnie, supra note 1, at 428 (citing Clawson et al., supra note 4, at 2372).
212. See generally Koh, supra note 148 (describing the parallel processes of social, political, and legal internalization 
of international norms into domestic law and arguing that “social internalization” is triggered by and often 
spurs political and legal internalization of international legal norms into domestic law).
213. Koh & Wishnie, supra note 1, at 430.
214. Id.
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litigation, political advocacy, and public commentary to shift national and public 
opinion in favor of the protracted effort to close the Guantánamo detention camps.215
 The Haitian refugee litigation thus offers an important example to clinical legal 
education, especially as conducted by the rapidly growing number of human rights 
clinics nationwide.216 Yale’s Lowenstein Human Rights Clinic consciously did not 
adopt the “small case” approach that some contemporary clinicians generally favor, in 
which students take on discrete individual cases like eviction defenses or divorces, 
and handle all court appearances while exercising professional judgment in the live-
client relationship.217 But neither was the Haitian refugee litigation an ordinary 
human rights clinic addressing such projects as analytic NGO reports documenting 
human rights abuses.218 The scale and velocity of the litigation did not allow for the 
usual degree of student responsibility or structured reflection ordinarily sought in 
clinical education.219
 Still, the Haitian refugee litigation accomplished many clinical objectives.220 The 
case involved substantial student participation in all aspects of the Haitian refugee 
litigation, from its inception to the final settlement. While students generally did 
not argue legal motions or appeals in court, they helped develop mixed litigation/
policy strategies; drafted countless pleadings, briefs, and discovery; took and defended 
depositions; identif ied, interviewed, and prepared witnesses; participated in 
negotiations; and examined many witnesses at trial.221 The inspiration that experience 
gave to so many members of Team Haiti to continue in public interest law showed 
that reflective lawyering can be achieved, even in complex transnational law reform 
matters.222 And both now and then, as life experience and case study, the litigation 
continues to inspire and nurture student passion for law as a force for human rights 
and social change.223
 Looking back, the Haitian refugee case was in many ways a throwback to the 
early days of clinical education, which included many complex law reform suits 
focused on civil rights and social justice.224 As I have noted elsewhere, the Haitian 
case ultimately “showed that what civil rights had been to the clinical education 
215. Id.
216. Id. (citing Hurwitz, supra note 201; Stacy Caplow, “Deport All the Students”: Lessons Learned in an X-treme 
Clinic, 13 Clinical L. Rev. 633 (2006) (reviewing Goldstein, Storming the Court: How a Band 





221. Id. at 430–31 (citing Clawson et al., supra note 4, at 2387–88). 
222. Id. at 431.
223. Id. (citing Clawson et al., supra note 4, at 2388–89).
224. Id. (citing Caplow, supra note 216, at 643 (“In the 1970s, many clinics did handle large impact cases as 
a means for advancing civil rights and social justice.”)).
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movement of the 1960s, international human rights could become for the clinical 
education movement of a new global century.”225 Significantly, even foreign clinical 
law professors in emerging justice systems have seized on the potential for the Haitian 
refugee litigation to inspire law reform and litigation efforts and to update legal 
institutions through clinical education.226 And the clearest and simplest message that 
the Haitian refugee case taught law students was just this: “You don’t have to have 
your law degree in hand to change the world.”
VI. CONCLUSION
 A quarter century later, the Haitian case should be remembered as more than just 
a memorable case. To paraphrase Justice Felix Frankfurter, it gave us a new way of 
looking at the law.227 It taught us how to attack and close legal black holes. It fostered 
the birth of transnationalism as a legal theory to promote human rights. It taught us 
how to pursue transnational legal process in a globalizing world through techniques 
of “LawFAIR.” And through experiential legal education, the litigation taught a 
young cohort of law students, “Team Haiti,” how to think globally and act locally, so 
that a quarter-century later that cohort has emerged as a mature and potent group of 
human rights advocates.228
 These are legacies that will not become dated. To see this, one need look no 
further than today’s Syrian refugee crisis.229 In Yogi Berra’s immortal words, “it’s like 
225. Id. at 431.
226. As proof of the Haitian case’s cross-border appeal, the Committee of Chinese Clinical Legal Educators 
secured Ford Foundation funding to translate and publish Storming the Court, under the Chinese title 
Fating Fengbao (“Courtroom Storm”), as part of their efforts to establish clinical legal education in the 
People’s Republic. Id. at 431 n.185. And at Peking University School of Transnational Law, a law student 
bidding to take the school’s Cross Border Advocacy Clinic provided the following statement of interest:
The first time I heard about “legal clinic” was in the summer in 2008. I spent the whole 
afternoon sitting down on the f loor of the biggest book store in Shanghai and finishing 
reading the book, A Documentary Companion to Storming the Court, where a band of law 
students from legal clinic of Yale law school fought against the president of United 
States for human rights on behalf of Haitian refugees detained at the American Navy 
base in Guantánamo Bay, Cuba. The book is not long, but it indeed encourages me to 
be a fighter for ones in need of justice[] for a long time. And at that time, I made my 
mind to be a member of legal clinic . . . some day. 
 E-mail from Stephen T. Yandle, Vice Dean, Peking Univ. Sch. of Transnat’l Law, Shenzhen China, to 
Harold Hongju Koh (Apr. 2, 2014, 11:39 PM) (on file with author).
227. Cf. Guar. Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 101 (1945) (“In overruling Swift v. Tyson, Erie R. Co. v. 
Tompkins did not merely overrule a venerable case. It overruled a particular way of looking at law . . . .”) 
(citation omitted).
228. See supra note 9.
229. In 1994, I argued that there was a “Haiti Paradigm” in U.S. human rights policy, whereby government 
officials tend to underrespond to a root cause crisis elsewhere in the world—whether in Haiti or Syria— 
instead choosing to wait, and then belatedly to react to a mass outflow of refugees, treating the refugees as 
the problem, not the symptom of a root cause that demands urgent political attention. See generally Koh, 
The “Haiti Paradigm,” supra note 4. Recently, Michael Ignatieff and his students have developed a 
perceptive, comprehensive, integrated plan for Syria that offers a far better approach to manage the current 
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déjà vu all over again.”230 Once again, we have interdictions and a search for legal 
black holes. We still have detention camps at Guantánamo and elsewhere. 
Governments are still pushing territorial theories of refugee and human rights law, 
and we are still engaged in a counter-search for better human rights advocacy 
strategies and clinical approaches. This dialectic will not end; it will only evolve.231
 Even so, there are moments of redemption. My most memorable came in late 
2000, when I was leaving the Clinton administration after serving for several years 
as Assistant Secretary of State for Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor. At my 
farewell dinner, a black government car suddenly pulled up. Out stepped Sandy 
Berger, Clinton’s National Security Advisor, with whom I had worked closely on 
Kosovo, East Timor, Sierra Leone, and many other human rights challenges.232 
Although we had worked together often, we had never discussed frankly the battles 
we had early in the Clinton administration over Haitian and Cuban refugees.233 
Sandy entered the room and gave a gracious toast. He said, “At the beginning of this 
administration, we were fighting with a group of Yale law students and their professor 
over the plight of the Haitians, and Harold, in the middle of that case, I appeared on 
television with you. When the camera went off, I said, ‘I want that guy on our side, 
fighting for human rights for the U.S. government. I’m here tonight to say thank you 
for your service to human rights, both inside and out of the government. And I want 
you to know that on Haiti, looking back, you folks were right and we were wrong.”
 Years later, Sandy Berger is gone,234 and now, so too is Michael Ratner.235 I miss 
them both intensely. But whenever I do, I recall that moment. Michael, wherever you 
are, I hope you can hear that message.
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